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ABSTRACT 
 
STATE VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
COURT CASES SUBMITTED AGAINST TURKEY ON DETENTION AND RIGHT 
TO LIFE 
Duygu Şendağ 
Cultural Studies, MA, 2010 
Thesis Advisor: Ayşe Öncü 
 
Turkey gave its citizens the right to individual petition to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in 1987.  In the same year, via legislative decree, State of Emergency 
Rule which excluded the acts of the administration or responsibility of public servants 
in the field of emergency issues from judicial review was declared in seven provinces 
located in the Kurdish region. At the juncture of these two critical shifts that envisaged 
significant changes in the legal status of millions of people, the human rights violations 
committed predominantly against Kurds during the state of emergency period were 
carried to the ECtHR in the absence of an effective and accessible domestic judicial 
mechanism. In the years that followed, the ECtHR was bombarded with thousands of 
individual applications from southeast Turkey, whereby the narratives of violence 
taking place in the 1990s were for the first time heard in a public forum. Yet, despite the 
thousands of the judgments of the Court finding Turkey guilty of breaching the 
Convention requirements, the effect of these judgments remained limited at the 
domestic level as a result of the development of the official narrative of security and 
counter-terrorism alongside the human rights narratives and reforms. What I propose to 
do in this thesis is to delve into the dynamics of this dual development of seemingly 
contradictory narratives – whereby rights given by one hand were taken away by the 
other – by  looking at the cases on alleged incidents of state killings or deaths in 
detention, submitted to the ECtHR against Turkey prior to May 2009. By looking at the 
ways of attribution of responsibility to the state and the transformation of the scopes of 
the cases by the Court in these proceedings, I try to understand the limitations of human 
rights law in denouncing state violence through locating the silences, exceptions and 
exclusions in the Court’s reasoning. 
    
  
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Kurdish Movement, Human 
Rights, Right to Life, Detention, Violence, State of Emergency 
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ÖZET 
 
İNSAN HAKLARI VE DEVLET ŞİDDETİ: TÜRKİYE ALEYHİNE AVRUPA 
İNSAN HAKLARI MAHKEMESİ’NE GÖTÜRÜLMÜŞ GÖZALTI VE YAŞAM 
HAKKI İLE İLGİLİ DAVALAR 
Duygu Şendağ 
Kültürel Çalışmalar MA, 2010 
Tez Danışmanı: Ayşe Öncü 
 
Türkiye Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’ne bireysel başvuruda bulunabilme hakkını 
1987’de vermiştir. Aynı yıl bir kanun hükmünde kararname ile Kürt bölgelerinde yer 
alan yedi şehirde olağanüstü hal ilan edilmiş ve böylece kolluk kuvvetlerinin bu 
alandaki uygulamaları yargısal denetimden muaf tutulmuştur. Milyonlarca insanın 
hukuki statüsünde değişikli öngören bu iki önemli gelişmenin kesişiminde, daha çok 
Kürtlere karşı işlenen insan hakları ihlalleri erişilebilir ve etkili bir iç hukuk 
mekanizmasının yokluğunda AİHM’e taşınmıştır. Takip eden yıllarda AİHM 
Türkiye’nin güneydoğusundan yapılan binlerce bireysel başvuru almış ve böylece 
1990’larda yaşanmış olan şiddete dair hikâyeler ilk defa kamusal bir forumda 
duyulmuştur. Mahkeme’nin Türkiye aleyhine vermiş olduğu binlerce karara rağmen, 
insan hakları söylemi ile birlikte güvenlik ve anti-terör söylemlerinin de gelişmesiyle, 
bu kararların etkisi ulusal seviyede kısıtlı kalmıştır. Bu tezde yapmayı amaçladığım 
Mayıs 2009’dan önce Türkiye aleyhine verilmiş gözaltında ölüm ile ilgili mahkeme 
kararlarını inceleyerek birbirine zıt olarak görünen bu iki söylemin iç dinamiklerini 
anlamaya çalışmaktır. Mahkemenin, devleti ve devletin sorumluluklarını nasıl 
kurguladığına ve mahkeme kararlarının mevcut ihtilafların kapsamlarını nasıl 
dönüştürdüğüne bakarak, insan hakları hukunun devlet şiddetine müdahale etmekte ne 
ölçüde kısıtlı kaldığını mahkemenin kararlarındaki istisna durumlarına ve suskunlukları 
üzerinden incelemeyi hedeflemekteyim. 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi (AİHM), Kürt Hareketi, İnsan 
Hakları, Yaşam Hakkı, Gözaltı, Olağanüstü Hal 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION1 
Recently, while walking down Istiklal Street, a central Istanbul thoroughfare, I came 
across a group of women surrounded by curious onlookers. I soon realized that these were 
the ‘Saturday Mothers’2, women who gather every Saturday to demand an account of their 
missing and dead relatives. I was familiar with the names under the photos held by the 
women as well as the details of their legal actions, but this was the first time I had actually 
seen the faces of, ‘the deceased’, whose cases I had analyzed throughout the chapters of 
this thesis. It was the Saturday Mothers, along with various local, national and international 
human rights networks who initially brought the issue state killings to the attention of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as well as to the Turkish and European public. 
This thesis will focus on the cases brought to the ECtHR by these mothers and many others 
mourning for their loss, and analyze the decisions and reasoning of the ECtHR.     
In 1987, two significant events occurred in Turkish law: Turkey gave its citizens the 
right to petition the ECtHR, and a State of Emergency Rule was decreed which excluded 
                                                            
1 This thesis is a collective work. Without the help and support of Ayşe Öncü, I would not be able to write this 
thesis. Virginia Brown Keyder read patiently my earlier drafts and  helped to develop my ideas through her 
invaluable comments and feedbacks. Leyla Neyzi kindly accepted to be in my thesis committee and supported 
me through the entire thesis-writing process. I would also like to thank to Dicle Koğacıoğlu who motivated 
me to pick up my topic and become interested in sociology of law.   
 
2A group formed intially of Mothers who have lost their sons and daughters in police custody in 1995. Until 
recent years Satudary Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, were subjected to severe police violence as they gathered 
every week in front of Galatasaray High School, Istiklal Street. 
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acts of public servants from judicial review by Turkish courts was declared in several 
provinces of the Kurdish region. Subsequently, human rights violations committed by 
public servants predominantly against Kurds during the state of emergency period were 
brought before the ECtHR. In the years that followed, the ECtHR came to function as an 
archive of previously unheard stories of state violence. This archive offered a glimmer of 
hope to those living in the Kurdish region of Turkey.  
Although the right to petition has been available since 1987, Kurds did not start to file 
cases in Strasbourg until after a 1992 visit to Diyarbakır by Kevin Boyle, a British human 
rights professor from Essex University (Kurban et al). The meeting was initiated by 
Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), an organization based in London. KHRP was 
founded by a Kurdish refugee in 1992 and worked with human rights professors in Essex 
University. The organization established connections with the Diyarbakır branch of the 
Human Rights Association (HRA) and initiated transnational links between the Kurdish 
lawyers in Turkey and the international community (Kurban et al). Kevin Boyle and 
François Hampson, another British law professor from Essex, advised Kurdish lawyers on 
the individual petition mechanism. The Kurdish lawyers, equipped with the training they 
received from British and Turkish professors pioneered the litigation in Strasbourg. 
Frequently the Turkish judge in the ECtHR Feyyaz Golcuklu referred to the cooperation 
between KHRP and HRA as the ‘’triangle between Diyarbakir-London-Strasbourg’’ in his 
dissenting opinions where he argued that the cases submitted to the Court were part of a 
conspiracy arranged by these organizations. 
The ECtHR decisions were significant not only for government officials, who 
considered them harmful to Turkey’s reputation in the European context, but also for 
various NGOs and opposition groups who view the Court as an alternative to the domestic 
legal mechanisms. Turkey tried to use Article 15, which grants the right to states to 
derogate from its obligations under the Convention in cases of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation. While Turkey was denied a margin of 
appreciation3 under Article 15, the United Kingdom was given a margin of appreciation 
                                                            
3 According to the margin of appreciation doctrine the judges are obliged to take into account the cultural, 
historic and philosophical differences between Strasbourg and the nation in question. The doctrine allows the 
court to take into effect the fact that the Convention will be interpreted differently in different signatory states. 
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based on the existence of a public emergency in Northern Ireland.4 Factors, including either 
awareness of differences in power between states or misplaced faith in the credentials of 
‘long-lived’ democracies, may have led the Court, perhaps unconsciously, to be more 
lenient towards the United Kingdom than towards Turkey (Dembour, 2006).  
Although there have been numerous ECtHR judgments finding Turkey in breach of 
the European Human Rights Convention (ECHR), the effect of these decisions has 
remained limited at the domestic level. The major reason for this has been the growth of an 
official narrative of security and counter-terrorism that trump the development of a human 
rights narrative and reforms (Çalı, forthcoming). This thesis aims to explore the 
development of seemingly contradictory narratives by examining allegations of state 
killings or deaths in detention presented to the ECtHR against Turkey prior to May 2009.  
Through an analysis of specific cases I propose to shed light on the relationship between 
human rights discourse and state violence by examining in particular how the ECtHR 
conceptualizes violence, attributes responsibility to state actors and applies exceptions to 
human rights norms in certain cases. In short, this thesis is an attempt to understand the 
relation of law and violence in the context of State of Emergency Rule and the ECtHR by 
examining how the ECtHR views some allegations of violence as contravening human 
rights norms while others do not.  For analytical purposes, I have limited my selection of 
cases5 to those involving detention and the right to life as set forth in Article 2 of ECHR as 
follows: 
 
   ARTICLE 2 
   Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4 See, Selly Marks, The Civil Liberties at the Margin: The UK Derogation and the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
5 Throughout the chapters, I use the names of the people as they appear on the legal proceedings in the ECtHR 
database, assuming that it is their own preference to use their real names and since there is public access to the 
database. 
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   Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
   (a) in defense of any person from unlawful violence; 
   (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
   (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
There are various interpretations in the cases as to what is meant by right to life in the 
Convention. By examining these interpretations, it is possible to see how the boundaries of 
the state are constructed by the Court as it attempts to assess whether death constitutes a 
violation of the Convention or a result of proportional use of force or in what cases the state 
is actively responsible for the death and in what cases it has merely omitted to exercise a 
preventative function. Therefore, this thesis is also an attempt to explore when and in what 
conditions an act of killing amounts to a breach of the right to life within human rights 
discourse.  
Recent studies have focused on law as an agent of social construction (Pottage, 2004) 
or as an active participant in the process through which history is written and memory 
constructed (Sarat&Kearns, 1999; Minow, 1987). In these studies ‘the legal’ is viewed not 
as mirroring the social, cultural and political, but instead as embedded in relatively 
autonomous structures that transcend and shape the content of social issues (Gordon, 1984; 
Kennedy, 1980). The ECtHR decisions, apart from being a set of legal operations and 
practices, have also influenced the extent and the content of the disputes as well as their 
social meanings by creating public knowledge regarding human rights issues. However, in 
this thesis, I mainly focus on the internal structure of legal discourse rather than its impact 
upon the social.   
My analysis has showed that although according to the case law of the Court, 
detention centers are generally considered as places where the state has full jurisdiction and 
knowledge regarding the course of events, torture as a performance is vital in the 
construction of a particular spatiality as a detention centre and the identification of the 
deceased as vulnerable. The Court will find a violation of the right to life only when the 
cause of death can be considered within the meaning of Article 3 (on torture). Torture as a 
practice that refers to an utterly unproportional use of force is significant in the Court’s 
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decisions, since the Court finds a violation of Article 2 only in circumstances in which the 
deceased can be constructed as a vulnerable being prior to his/her death. The practice of 
torture helps the Court to fabricate such a construction. Even in disappearance cases where 
the body of the deceased is never found, the finding of a violation in Article 2 by the Court 
is followed by Article 3 with respect to the applicant rather than the deceased for the 
suffering caused by the disappearance. That being said in connection with the detention 
cases, in cases where the applicant accuses state functionaries of abduction and killing, the 
Court rarely finds a substantive violation of Article 2. In abduction cases, confronted with 
serious allegations of state violence which fall outside this narrow interpretation, the Court 
minimizes real human rights violations and thereby conceals the fundamental relationship 
between the state and violence. By only finding a violation by the government of failing to 
conduct effective investigation following deprivation of life in these cases, the Court 
frames real human rights violations as lack of expertise in criminal investigation. 
As of 1 January 2009, the Court had issued 1,939 judgments concerning Turkey, in 
1,676 of which the Court found at least one violation. Two hundred ninety four of the cases 
were struck after the applicants and the government reached what is known as a 'friendly 
settlement'6.  In 66 cases the Court found that Turkey violated right to life, and in 120, it 
failed to conduct an effective investigation after the deprivation of life.7 In 53 of these 
cases, which constitute the main subject of this thesis, death/killing occurs either in 
detention or in some other place considered by the Court to be comparable to detention 
centers. In 26 of the detention cases, the Court found that Turkey violated the right to life 
and in all 53 of the detention cases the Court concluded that Turkey failed to conduct an 
effective investigation following deprivation of life. These cases are contained in the online 
                                                            
6 Mutual accord between the government and the applicant in which the government acknowledges the 
violation and offers compensation for it.  
 
7 The European Court of Human Rights, Some Facts and Figures 2009 
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database of the ECtHR.8  I have relied on Turkish translations for those cases which are 
only in French. 9   
To understand the cases analyzed here, it is important to understand the procedures 
under which the Court operates and evaluates the cases. Equally important is the context 
within which the ECtHR emerged as an alternative to domestic law. Chapter Two provides 
some insight into the evolution of human rights, the operation of the Court and the general 
context in which cases were filed. In Chapter Three I discuss the right to life Article and the 
detention cases. By giving examples from cases, I try to demonstrate that detention is not a 
stable category and is a matter of dispute between the applicant and the government.  
In Chapter Four, by showing that the Court finds a violation of right to life only if 
death is a result of torture, I suggest that torture is significant not only for naming an 
incident as ‘detention’, but also in the construction of the identity of the deceased. 
Accordingly, the Court in the majority of the cases found a violation of the right to life only 
in those cases where the deceased can be imagined to be a victim of disproportional force 
because only then is the identity of the deceased constructed as a vulnerable detainee and 
the government is accused of failing to protect his/her right to life. Limiting actionable 
violence in detention centers to torture, however, results in the exclusion of victims of other 
types of violence from judicial protection and restricts the protection of law to those 
envisaged as vulnerable by the Court.  
In Chapter Five, by looking at cases in which government officials are accused of 
abduction and killing, I explore how the legal framing of ‘abduction’ rather than ‘detention’ 
affects the Court’s approach. Due to its restricted interpretation of state action to certain 
spatial settings, the Court fails to respond effectively to accusations of breach that should, 
in the writer’s opinion, be actionable.  
 
 
 
                                                            
8 http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ 
 
9The English or Turkish translations of the French cases can be found in, http://aihm.anadolu.edu.tr/ and 
http://www.inhak-bb.adalet.gov.tr/aihm/aihmtkliste.asp. The database of the ECtHR can be reached through 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
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CHAPTER II 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECtHR 
Human Rights 
The origins of human rights, the degree to which human rights can be considered as 
the ideals of liberal market or Western imperialism and the relation between religions and a 
secular view of human rights are debated between scholars. The origins of human rights 
date back to religious texts and early legal documents such as Hammurabi’s code or Greek 
city states. However in the abstract sense we use today, human rights are considered to be 
the product of the 17th and 18th century European thought, particularly the Enlightenment 
ideals which emphasized the notion of ‘natural law.’ Natural law theory, based on the 
existence of a law whose content is set by nature and therefore is valid everywhere, also 
gave rise to the idea of natural rights, which provided the philosophical basis for the 
emergence of the Bill of Rights in Europe and United States. In that sense, the Bill of 
Rights of England (1689), the Bill of Rights of the Unites States (1791) and the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in France are landmarks in the history of 
human rights discussions. 
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Human rights emerged as a subject of international relations with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.10 The Declaration arose directly from the experience 
of the Second World War and represents the first global expression of rights to which all 
human beings are entitled. Today, the International Bill of Human Rights consists of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
two Optional Protocols. The Universal Declaration aims to set moral standards to the 
practices of the states and although it is not legally binding, the Declaration has influenced 
various national constitutions since 1948.  
In Europe, the devastation and human suffering caused by the Second World War 
paved the way for the idea of European Integration through the creation of common 
institutions. The Council of Europe was established by ten states11 in 1949 as an 
organization to work on the issues of legal standards, human rights, democratic 
development and cultural cooperation. European Convention on Human Rights was 
adopted in 1950 and European Court of Human Rights which supervises compliance with 
the Convention was established in 1959 by the Council of Europe.  Any person who feels 
his/her rights set forth in the Convention are violated by a state party can take a case to the 
Court. The establishment of a Court to protect individuals from human rights violations is 
an innovative feature for an international convention on human rights, since it gives the 
individual an active role on the international arena. The European Convention is still the 
only international human rights agreement providing such a high degree of individual 
protection. The European Convention on Human Rights is generally regarded as the most 
effective and advanced international system for the protection of human rights in existence 
today. The Court’s workload has increased dramatically, as the number of the member 
                                                            
10 There are various debates in relation to human rights among scholars. The two of the most important 
concepts in terms of understanding the application of human rights to policies and practices are considered to 
be universalism and cultural relativism. While the universalist approach suggests that certain rights are natural 
or inherent to humanity and therefore they are so fundamental that there should be no exception to their 
application, cultural relativism is based on the idea that there are no objective standards by which others can 
be judged. Another debate questions the coinciding of the post-colonial era with the institutionalization of the 
human rights discourse and view human rights as another tool to control the non-West in the post-colonial 
era.  
Or whether human rights, being institutionalized in the post- colonial era, has been created by the West to   
11 These ten states are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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states in the Council of Europe has increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War, 
when Central and Eastern European countries became members in the early 1990s. 
During the Cold War era, because of the ideological and geopolitical struggle between 
Soviet Union and United States, the progress in the human rights area was terminated. 
Therefore human rights had barely any active life before 1989, when all violations were 
sanctioned in the fight against communism. Since the end of the Cold War, the US 
government has been central to the development of the idea of the ‘’human’’ implicit in 
rights discourse (Asad, 2003). Al Qaeda attacks of September 11 in 2001, the subsequent 
declaration of a "global war on terror," and the rapid development of more stringent 
counter-terrorism efforts have undermined the issue of human rights. Indeed, following 
9/11 a number of countries that routinely violate the human rights of political prisoners or 
dissidents found tacit American sanction to expand their repressive practices. Therefore, 
human rights started to be seen as subordinate to security objectives or even antithetical to 
security.  
 
The context 
 
Turkey gave its citizens the right to individual petition to the ECtHR in 1987 as part 
of a strategy to facilitate its accession to the EU. In the same year, via legislative decree, 
State of Emergency Rule was declared. This legislative decree required the establishment 
of a new administrative unit called the Governorship of State of Emergency region, 
Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği, which has jurisdiction over ten provinces12 located in the 
Southeastern Turkey. This legislative decree required for the first time the formation of a 
new administrative unit to govern the selected seven provinces (Üskül, 2003). The decree 
contradicted Constitutional provisions in two ways. First it required the formation of a new 
administrative body unrecognized in the Constitution (Duran, 1988). Secondly, by creating 
a space of emergency in a large part of the Kurdish region of Turkey, it vested 
extraordinary powers in regional governors and excluded the acts of administration or 
responsibility of public servants in the field of emergency issues from judicial review, in 
                                                            
12 These ten provinces are Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Siirt, Mardin, Tunceli, Van, Elazığ, Bingöl, Şırnak, Batman. 
The State of Emergency Rule was lifted in 2002. 
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violation of the Constitution (Muller 1996). In many of the cases before the ECtHR, the 
legislative decree was itself referred as evidence that the legal framework operating in 
southeastern Turkey inadequately protected the right to life. In its various judgments the 
Court acknowledges the deficiencies in the legal framework in terms of fostering a lack of 
accountability for members of the security forces for their actions.  
Thousands of petitions from the state of emergency region were filed under various 
articles of the ECHR, a great majority of which related to right to life13. More precisely, 
ninety out of the one hundred fifty three right to life cases originated from the ten provinces 
under state of emergency. This flood of individual applications from southeast Turkey 
enabled the narratives of violence taking place in 1990s to be heard for the first time in a 
public forum (Çalı, forthcoming).  
The Structure of the ECtHR 
Applications to the ECtHR first arrive in the Registry, whose task is defined as 
providing legal and administrative support to the Court in the exercise of its judicial 
functions.14 The Registry is composed of administrative and technical staff, translators and 
lawyers who assure that the applications are in correct form and prepare them for 
adjudication with the help of other staff. From the Registry, the applications are sent to 
either a three-member committee15 or a chamber16 where admissibility is decided 
                                                            
13 The first applications lodged to the Court for the human rights violations against Kurds were brought by 
Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in partnership with Essex University Human Rights Professors. 
KHRP is an NGO founded in London in 1992. Because the lawyers operating in the State of Emergency 
Region did not have the particular expertise in making submissions to a highly bureaucratic mechanism at that 
time, in the beginning of 1990s the great majority of the cases were brought to the court with the assistance of 
KHRP. 
 
14 http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry/ (retrieved in 
10 May 2009). 
15 Committees  are founded to eliminate the applications that are clearly unfounded at an early stage to 
decrease the work load of the court. They consist of three judges. 
 
16 Chambers evaluate the merits of the cases and present their judgments. The cases in certain circumstances 
can be referred to the Grand chamber. 
  
11
unanimously or by majority vote respectively. The decisions of the three-member 
committees or chambers constitute a secondary selection process. It is important to note 
that two out of three applications do not pass the registration stage (Dembour, 2006:124). 
Applications allocated to a committee or a chamber are accompanied by copies of relevant 
documents.17  A high percentage of applications are found inadmissible by the three-
member committee or the chamber. 
In the absence of a thorough domestic judicial examination of the events in question, 
the Court was confronted with a large number of cases in which the primary facts were in 
dispute. Therefore the Commission18 acted as a first-instance tribunal of fact.19 It dealt with 
conflicting factual accounts of events and established the facts on which the case would be 
presented to the Court for adjudication. Under this system, the Court reserved the power to 
dispute the Commission’s finding of fact. In the right to life cases I show that the 
Commission was aware of its limitations as a first-instance tribunal of fact, due to language 
problems, lack of detailed and direct familiarity with the conditions of the region and its 
lack of power to compel witnesses to appear and testify20. In the majority of the right to life 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
17 The ECtHR, Some Facts and Figures, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/65172EB7-DE1C-4BB8-
93B1-B28676C2C844/0/FactsAndFiguresEN.pdf 
 
18 With the ratification of protocol 11 in 1998, the structure of the court was changed with the aim of 
responding to the increasing applications efficiently. The Court and the Commission were merged into a 
single body. In the former system the major tasks of the Commission was to decide the admissibility of the 
applications and arrange friendly settlements between the applicant and the state. Also the commission was 
conducting investigations when such needs arise. In that system, a case was brought to the attention of the 
Court only when it was referred by the Commission and after the failure of attempts for friendly settlement 
between the parties within the set time period. 
 
19In almost none of the cases all the witnesses who are summoned by the Commission and the applicant are 
heard. Although, under the convention the state is responsible for facilitating and cooperating the fact-finding 
exercise of the Commission, this hardly happens. The hearings mostly take place in Ankara or Strasbourg. 
Some assigned witnesses of the applicant turn down the Commission delegates due to lack of financial 
resources for their travel. Responsible from gathering the assigned witnesses, in some cases the state declares 
its incapability in reaching the witnesses due to their being kidnapped by the PKK or the witness' inability to 
attend the hearings for they are in prison. Sometimes the witnesses who approve the request and inform the 
Commission of their attendance do not show up at the end. In these cases the Commission asks for a written 
document from the government with the signature of the assigned witness to make sure that he or she did not 
go back, intimidated by the government.(Timurtas v Turkey) 
 
20 Ergi v Turkey, App. No. 23818/94 paragraph [29]. 
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applications filed in the ECtHR during the 1990s, since primary facts were in dispute, the 
Commission was required to conduct an investigation despite its limitations.  
Despite the fact that the majority of the applications do not reach the stage of 
judgment, the court's work load has dramatically increased since the 1980s.  There were no 
cases in the 1950s, ten in the 1960s, twenty six in the 1970s, and one hundred sixty nine in 
the 1980s (Janis et al 2008:113). More than 90% of the Court’s judgments since its creation 
in 1959 were delivered between 1998 and 2008.21 On 1 January 2009 in total approximately 
97,300 applications were pending before the Registry, the Committee and Chambers, and 
the Court. More than half of these applications have been lodged against one of three 
countries: Russia, Turkey and Romania.22 
 In almost all cases brought against Turkey, the preliminary objection of the 
government was based on the non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies, a prerequisite for 
lodging an application. The Akdıvar case23, therefore, set a precedent as it was declared 
admissible under circumstances in which the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
was in dispute (Kurban et al. Juristras Report). In the Akdıvar case the Court acknowledged 
that Article 26 of the ECHR requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies is relevant only 
when the domestic remedies exist not only in theory but in practice.24 The exception made 
in the Akdıvar case was, however, accompanied by the Court's emphasis that its ruling is 
confined to the particular circumstances of the present case and it is not to be interpreted as 
a general statement that remedies are ineffective in this area of Turkey or that applicants are 
absolved from their obligation of exhausting domestic remedies. The Court's decision of 
admissibility in Akdivar case provided encouragement to other potential applicants from 
the region, but also created uncertainty, as the Court refrained from making a general 
statement regarding the inaccessibility of domestic remedies.  
                                                            
21 The ECtHR, Some Facts and Figures, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/65172EB7-DE1C-4BB8-
93B1-B28676C2C844/0/FactsAndFiguresEN.pdf (retrieved in 10 May 2009). 
22 http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/981B9082-45A4-44C6-829A-202A51B94A85/0/ENG_Infodoc.pdf 
(retrieved in 10 May 2009). 
23 Akdivar v Turkey (21893/93), judgment of 30 August 1996. In this case the applicant maintains that the 
destruction of their houses was part of a State-inspired policy which had affected two million people. The 
Court eventually finds a violation of Article 8 (right to privacy), and Article 1 of Protocol no 1, (right to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions). 
24 Akdıvar v Turkey, (21893/93), paragraph [73-77] 
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Similarly in Aksoy v Turkey25 the Court absolved the applicant from his obligation to 
exhaust domestic remedies, yet found it unnecessary to examine his allegation regarding 
the non-existence of domestic remedies as part of an ''administrative practice''.26 If the 
Court had referred to an ‘administrative practice’ preventing applicants from making use of 
domestic judicial mechanisms,  subsequent applicants would have  been able to go directly 
to Strasbourg without having to produce evidence to demonstrate why national remedies 
were illusory in their particular circumstances (Dembour, 2006: 52). In the years that 
followed, thousands of applications were rejected due to non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. The flexible interpretation of the requirement of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, did however pave the way for other applications to be declared admissible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
25 Aksoy v Turkey, (21987/93), judgment of 18/12/1996. In this case the applicant alleges that when he was in 
custody, he was subjected to torture by the police and because of that now he cannot use his arms and hands. 
The Court finds a violation of article 3 (Prohibition of Torture), article 5 (Right to Liberty) and Article 13 
(Right to Effective Remedy). 
26 Aksoy v Turkey, (21987/93), judgment of 18/12/1996, paragraph [46]. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE ARTICLE AND DETENTION CASES 
‘Right to Life’ Article 
Article 2 on the right to life ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the 
Convention, to which no derogation is permitted. For the Court, together with Article 3 
prohibiting torture, Article 2 enshrines the basic values of the  democratic societies making 
up the Council of Europe.  As will be seen in subsequent chapters, however, interpretation 
of this article can become complicated.  The text of the Article is reproduced here for easy 
reference: 
1. Everyone's Right to Life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
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This article places both negative and positive obligations on signatory states. The 
negative obligation of the state is 'not to kill.’ More precisely, the state must refrain from 
killing or planning to kill in all circumstances not prescribed by law.  The article also 
imposes the positive obligation to protect the right to life. The Court, however, is careful in 
interpreting this obligation as it could result in designating a state liable for almost every 
death/killing incident. Thus, the Court limits the obligation of states to protect the right to 
life to cases in which the risk to life is real and immediate, and can be known or ought to 
have been known by state officials. The case law states that the reason for a narrow 
interpretation of this positive obligation is the ‘unpredictability of human conduct.’ In other 
words, according to the Court, because human conduct is ‘unpredictable’, the government 
cannot be held responsible for ‘not knowing’ about or ‘not preventing’ every risk to life. 
Therefore, the obligation to protect the right to life is not absolute but subject to the Court’s 
interpretation in the context of a particular case. States also have a positive obligation to 
conduct an effective investigation following death and killing incidents and must conduct 
some form of effective official investigation when individuals are killed as a result of the 
use of force.27 Under the ECtHR system, the first two obligations, i.e.  ‘not to kill’ and ‘to 
protect the Right to Life’, form the ‘substantive’ part of the Article, while the obligation to 
carry out an effective investigation is considered ‘procedural.’ 
Another important feature of the right to life article concerns who may bring the 
application when the victim of the breach of right to life is no longer alive. According to 
the Convention, the ‘right to individual petition’28, belongs to the victim.29 In the ECtHR 
system the ‘victim’ is someone whose rights as set forth in the Convention are violated. In 
right to life cases, applicants are expected to demonstrate why the particular death resulted 
                                                            
27 In the EctHR system the obligation of investigation concerns not the result of the investigation, but the 
means, such as the proper preparation of the forensic reports or collecting evidence. Therefore the Court is not 
concerned whether the perpetrators of the killing are found and detained or not. 
 
28 See Article 48 of the Convention which elaborates who can bring a case before the Court. 
 
29 To clarify the ‘victim status’ through an example, if I see someone dead lying on the ground and after the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies regarding the fate of that person decide to take his case to the ECtHR, for 
the Court to find my case admissible, I need to submit why the death of that particular person puts me in 
victim status. Therefore, the right to life cases are mainly brought to the Court through the relatives of the 
deceased. 
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in their victimization. Therefore in majority of the cases the applicants are the relatives of 
the deceased. The change in the position of the victim in right to life cases transforms the 
substance of the subject matter and content of the right granted by the Convention in such a 
way that the obligation of the state under the article turns out to “protect the right to life, 
rather than life itself’’ (Fawcett, 1987).   
 
Detention Cases and the ‘Right to Life’ 
In detention cases, as opposed to other right to life cases, the burden of proof30  is on 
the state rather than the applicant. This means that the state must prove that there was 
nothing officials could have done to prevent death in question. The main reasons for this 
reversal in burden of proof are, first, that the government is considered to have full 
jurisdiction over and the knowledge of the course of events leading to death in detention 
and secondly that detainees are considered to be in a vulnerable position. In these cases 
therefore the government must account for any injuries to the detainees that occur during 
entry to and exit from a detention center.31  
My analysis of the cases has shown that ‘detention’ is not necessarily synonymous 
with ‘in detention centers’. Instead, the category of detention may apply to any space where 
the state has full control. Because the extent of state control over a particular space is open 
to dispute and both parties have a stake in whether a particular case will be ‘named’ as 
detention or not by the Court, it is usually a point of contention between the parties. In this 
sense, the detention cases can also be considered as a struggle revolving around the notion 
of space with the aim of inciting the Court to refer, or deflecting it from referring a 
                                                            
30 Proof’s being seen as a burden is a product of the modern theory of law, as in ancient law proof was 
regarded as the right of one or the other of the contending parties. See, Weber 1967, On Law in Economy and 
Society, pp. 227. 
 
31 ‘’Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. 
Consequently, where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on 
release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused. The 
obligation on the authorities to account for the treatment of an individual in custody is particularly stringent 
where that individual dies. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive 
knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of 
fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may 
be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.’’ 
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particular spatial setting as detention. The way detention is ‘named’ is crucial in 
determining who is liable for the death and the claims of the parties. 
For instance in Çakıcı v Turkey32, the main point of contention between the applicant 
and state was the spatial setting in which Ahmet Çakıcı's death occurred. His relatives 
argued for his disappearing/dying whilst in police custody, while the government's 
argument was based on the alleged absence of his name in any of the custody records: 
Ahmet Çakıcı was a militant member of the PKK organisation. Following an armed clash 
between the PKK and the security forces on 17 to 19 February 1995, he had been found dead with 
fifty-five other militants at Kıllıboğan Hill. Ahmet Çakıcı had been implicated in the killing on 
23 October 1993 of five teachers from Dadaş whom he had reportedly described as “servile dogs of 
the State”. He most probably disappeared after this incident with the intention of escaping justice 
and continuing his activities for the PKK.33 
For the government, Ahmet Çakıcı was not in detention, but on Kıllıboğan Hill, 
clashing with state forces at the time of his death. In so doing the state wished to place him 
within the exception set out in paragraph 2 of Article 2 and deny him standing as a ‘citizen’ 
with rights by showing he was engaged in a certain illegal action and in the possession of 
firearms. Partially admitting to the alleged act, the government contended that the issue was 
not who killed Çakıcı, but rather where he was killed, with the intent to exclude him from 
the obligation of protection of the Article 2 right to life. In the case that the Court ‘names’ 
and ‘frames’ the incident as a ‘security operation’ rather than ‘detention’, the Court creates 
the grounds for the government to evade responsibility and deny knowledge of the incident, 
unlike in cases of detention, the exclusive knowledge of where is attributed to the state. In 
the Çakıcı case, the Court found a substantive violation of the Article 2 and declared the 
state liable for the death.34 A witness, who testified that he was in the same cell with Çakıcı 
while in detention, led the Court to reject the government’s allegation and decide that 
Çakıcı was indeed in detention at the time of death.  
In these cases, what is at stake for the applicant is ‘spacing’ the deceased under the 
jurisdiction and within the knowledge of government agents. The government, on the other 
                                                            
32 A very similar case to Çakıcı case is Ikincisoy v Turkey, in which the government alleges that Mehmet 
Ikincisoy was killed in a clash, while the applicant asserts that he is killed by torture in detention. The Court 
in this case also decides that there is a violation of article 2 from both substantive and procedural aspects.  
33 Çakıcı v. Turkey (23657/94), judgment of 08/07/99,  paragraph 20. 
34 Ibid, paragraph 85. 
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hand, in order not to be found in substantive violation of Article 2, denies jurisdiction and 
knowledge by arguing for the existence of another armed individual/group apart from state 
forces. The attribution or denial of jurisdiction and knowledge is also essential for the 
attribution of an identity to the deceased party. While proving that the deceased was indeed 
killed under detention would construct the identity of the killed as a ‘vulnerable’ detainee 
according to the case law of the Court, being armed places him outside the protected 
category of ‘citizens.’ How the deceased is identified then, determines which paragraph of 
the Article 2 will apply, and consequently will be crucial to how the Court decides the case.  
The dispute over ‘space’ between the applicant and government also complicates the 
meaning of detention as a category. For instance in cases of Özalp35, Demiray36 and Yasin 
Ates37  the government, acknowledging that the deceased were all in detention, contends 
that they were outside the detention center, being taken by soldiers to reveal the hide-outs 
of PKK members, and died on the way when explosive material, placed on the road by the 
PKK, blew up. They contend that although the deceased were under official control and 
jurisdiction, they were killed by the explosives placed by the PKK in order not to be found 
in substantive violation of right to life attempted to avoid jurisdiction and knowledge.   
Dundar v Turkey38 is another good example to demonstrate the significance of 
spatiality upon the way law functions. Mesut Dundar on many occasions walked in front of 
the crowd in Kurdish national holidays, carrying the Kurdish colours; yellow, red and 
green. His activities attracted the attention of the police, and he was taken into custody 
three times, every time being beaten and tortured by the officers. In July 1992, police 
officers from Cizre Police Headquarters came to the applicant’s house to take Mesut 
Dündar to Elazığ Psychiatric Hospital for treatment. Being taken to the Police 
Headquarters, Mesut Dündar feared he would be killed in the hospital and escaped through 
a window. The police officers then threatened to kill his father if he did not find his son and 
bring him back. After promising to bring in his son, the applicant was released. A few 
                                                            
35 Ozalp v Turkey (32457/96), Judgment Of 08/07/2004 
 
36 Demiray v Turkey (27308/95), Judgment Of 04/04/2001 
 
37 Yasin Ates v Turkey (30949/96), Judgment Of 31/08/2005 
 
38 Dündar v Turkey (26972/95), judgment of 20/12/2005 
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months later, Mesut Dündar's strangled body was found near a watermill in Sulak Village. 
According to an interview made with women from the village who witnessed the incident 
by Özgür Gündem, the pro-Kurdish newspaper, four armed persons, one of whom was 
thought to be a police officer, had strangled Mesut Dündar while his arms were tied behind 
his back. Soldiers, who came to the place where Mesut Dündar had been strangled 
following the killing, dragged his body behind an armoured personnel carrier, claiming that 
they were doing so because they thought there might be a booby-trap under the body. When 
the applicant’s relatives saw the body of Mesut Dündar at the hospital, they noticed that his 
body was covered with bruises and spots. In response to these allegations, the government 
asserted that a PKK flag was found in one of the pockets of Mesut Dündar’s corpse 
indicating that he was murdered by the PKK. Not receiving any concrete results from the 
domestic investigations as to the fate of Mesut Dündar, the applicant brought the case 
before the ECtHR, alleging that Mesut Dündar was taken into custody prior to his murder, 
and that no credible explanation for his death was given by the government. The state 
contended that its officials cannot be held responsible, since the events that took place 
following the escape of Mesut Dündar from the police were entirely unknown and the 
applicant's allegation that his son was killed while in custody had therefore no basis. The 
government also contended that Mesut Dündar joined the PKK and was killed by members 
who feared that he would divulge information about their activities. The Court stated that 
persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to 
protect them found that: 
 
Mesut Dündar was killed in September 1992 that is some two months after he had 
escaped from the police station, during which time he was at large. It follows, 
therefore, that it is not for the respondent Government to account for the death of the 
applicant's son. In the circumstances of the present case, the burden of proving the 
allegation that his son was killed by agents of the State remains on the applicant.39 
 
The Court decided that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the applicant's 
son was killed by, or with the connivance of, state agents. The burden of proof which is 
                                                            
39 Dündar v Turkey (26972/95), judgment of 20/12/2005, paragraph 65 
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usually on the state in cases concerning death incidents taking place in custody, was 
reversed in Dündar v Turkey on the grounds that Mesut Dündar had escaped from the 
police station. In addition, the case law regarding the vulnerability of the detainees is not 
applied in Mesut Dündar’s case because he was outside the detention center. If so, does 
Mesut Dundar, an escapee and  therefore a person ‘wanted’ by the authorities, cease to be a 
target of  state officials when he is outside the police station? Why does the Court, in this 
case, find that Dündar, having escaped from the police station is no longer in a vulnerable 
position, and therefore refuse to find a substantive violation of Article 2? What is the 
relation between the judicial enforcement of the right to life and vulnerability within human 
rights discourse? How is ‘vulnerability’ discursively, materially and spatially constructed in 
relation to human rights norms and transformed into legal language? Is Mesut Dündar, as 
an escapee, considered to be no longer under the jurisdiction of the State when he is outside 
of the detention center? Thus, how is the limit of the state’s jurisdiction and knowledge 
constructed and maintained in human rights law? In the following chapters I will try to 
answer these questions using examples from diverse cases. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: 
an animal with the additional capacity for a political  
existence: modern man is an animal whose politics 
place his existence as a living being in question.  
(Foucault, History of Sexuality) 
 
SUFFERING AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
 
Introduction 
The way torture is defined in law and its image in the public psyche in different 
periods needs to be examined in order to trace the evolution in the relationship between 
pain, truth and the body. State torture has not always been strictly prohibited in national 
legislation or religious law. On the contrary, in the intersection of religion and law, the pain 
and suffering experienced in the practice of torture used to be seen as providing the socially 
redeeming benefits of moral and spiritual cleansing, therefore indispensable for the 
discovery of truth (Nagan&Atkins, 2001). The employment of torture in past  times was 
therefore  an important example of the way in which the legal institutions reflect broader 
cultural logic in the sense that torture testified both to the ‘meaningfulness of human 
suffering’ and the corresponding ‘valuelessness of human volition’ (Silverman, 2001: 8). 
The ECtHR system and international law in general, which rest on the ‘meaninglessness of 
suffering’ and the ‘freedom of individual choice’, conceive Article 3 in ECHR on torture as 
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allowing no derogation, regardless of the circumstances. The main reason for my 
considering the death incidents under detention in relation to Article 3 on torture in ECHR 
is the narrow conceptualization of violence in the Court’s reasoning and judgments, as a 
result of which the possibilities of exerting violence in detention is restricted to the practice 
of torture, thereby excluding various other practices with lethal consequences such as 
causing one to fall off or commit suicide. As the prototype of the free individual projected 
by a liberal creed lies at the centre of the Convention and the Court’s reasoning, the cases I 
will analyze in this chapter, I believe, will demonstrate how the Court, by constantly 
treating some detained individuals as vulnerable, non-agentive victims subjected to 
suffering, and others as being in possession of free will and agency, frequently strays from 
its established case law on injuries occurring in detention. 
In this chapter, I will analyze the cases in which death occurred in detention centres 
by looking at the Court’s understanding of the concept of detention. Although according to 
the case law of the Court, detention centres are generally considered as places where the 
state has full jurisdiction and knowledge regarding the course of events, I argue that torture 
as a performance is vital in the construction of a particular spatiality as a detention centre 
and the identification of the deceased as vulnerable. I suggest that the vulnerability of the 
detained, referred to in the case law of the Court, is not all-encompassing, but an exclusive 
category depending on the performativity of the deceased at the time of being killed. 
Vulnerability, therefore, is not an identity imputed on any detainee, yet the identity of the 
detainee is ‘performatively constituted’ (Butler, 1990: 25), by the Court through a selective 
evaluation of the position of the detainee vis-à-vis the state whereby the questions of 
jurisdiction and knowledge that the government is considered to be in possession of, is 
assessed and judgment is made. If rights are relations between right-subjects (persons) and 
right-objects (persons, physical objects, abstract legal entities) (Raz, 2003: 176), I suggest 
that the attribution of the cause of death as torture is decisive in the Court’s reasoning due 
to the uneven relation that the practice of torture constitutes between the tortured subject 
and the torturer, in which the tortured, vulnerable and non-agentive, is reduced to a 
suffering being. As this is the case, it is even possible to trace references to torture in 
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disappearance cases where neither the place where the deceased is taken is known nor is the 
body of the disappeared ever found. 
 
Human Rights and Torture 
 
In Gomi v Turkey40, four prisoners died and seventy were wounded as a result of force 
used by prison guards in Ümraniye Prison. The case came before the ECtHR. The state 
acknowledged the involvement of prison officials in the incident and alleged that use of 
force was inevitable as the prisoners, holding desks, radiator pipes and parts of beds as 
weapons, managed to come out of their cells to the prison corridor by breaking the main 
door of the ward. According to the applicant, the rebellion was a consequence of violence 
used against the prisoners during their transfer to the prison.  The prisoners were then 
denied medical treatment and were allowed no visitors. The Court found no substantive 
violation of right to life as the case was framed as a security operation in which the state 
forces were found to have used proportional force.41 Thus the fact that the applicants were 
detainees does not suffice for the Court to find a violation of the right to life. In Gomi v 
Turkey, two points are worth emphasizing in order to understand the shift in the Court’s 
attitudes towards detainees and the type of violence prohibited by the Convention. First, the 
Court distinguished previous case law which attributes vulnerability to the detainees. As the 
detainees at the time of death were involved in a confrontation with the prison guards, their 
specific performance with makeshift arms strips them of the vulnerability that the Court 
imputes to detainees in its case law. Secondly, the violence used by the prison guards 
against the detainees is not framed as torture by the Court, as not every kind of violence to 
detained persons is viewed as torture. The Court frames the confrontation between the 
detainees and prison guards as an encounter in which the concept of proportionality in 
terms of the use of force by the prison guards is in dispute, rather than as torture which 
implicates an uneven relationship between the two sides.  
                                                            
40 Gomi v Turkey (35962/97), judgment of 21/03/2007 
 
41 Similar cases are Ceyhan Demir and Others v. Turkey (34491/97) and  Satık v. Turkey (no. 36961/97) 
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The disproportionality of torture as a way of exerting force and the uneven relation 
that the practice of torture inscribes between the tortured and the torturer are depicted by 
Elaine Scarry (1987) as she discusses torture and phenomenology of pain with respect to 
the bible where being God is conceived to speak as a being that has only voice. Humans, on 
the other hand, have bodies on which God’s voice is inscribed. In a similar vein, for Scarry, 
through the process of torture, the torturer turns into a voice asking questions and making 
further demands, while the tortured is converted into a body under severe corporal pain. 
The transformation of the torturer into a God-like being, without body but voice, and the 
tortured into a body without proper voice; groaning and clamoring is what marks torture as 
an acutely disproportional act that constructs an uneven relationship between the tortured 
and torturer, like the relationship between human and God. In Gomi v Turkey, the Court 
does not find a substantive violation, but only a procedural one, since the detainees taking 
part in a rebellion did not fit in the Court’s projection of ‘vulnerable detainee’ referred in its 
case law and therefore are not constructed in an uneven relationship to whom the force used 
can be considered to be disproportional. 
Torture as a form of punishment or a way of obtaining information is frequently used 
in particular circumstances by state officials regardless of the dichotomies of first world-
third world or democratic-totalitarian (Avelar, 2004). Torture is defined by the UN 
Committee Against Torture (CAT) as ‘’any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him information or a confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him, [...] when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.42 Thus, in international law, 
torture is defined as a particular form of inflicting pain by state functionaries for specific 
purposes, rather than a ‘’lawless rage’’ (Foucault, 1978). The act of cruelty named as 
torture when used by the state, if committed by an individual without an official status, 
would not constitute torture in the context of international law, but an assault (Scott, 1995: 
3). Torture is a technique that has its own rationale driven by a particular purpose, ‘’a 
                                                            
42 Article 1 of  Convention Against Torture and Other Inhuman, Degrading or Cruel Treatmen or Punishment 
(CAT). 
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calculated production of an effect’’ (Avelar, 2004: 45) which inscribes a particular power 
relation and sets the terms of space. Thus, following DeCerteau’s conceptualization of 
space as a concept that ‘’occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient and 
situate it’’ (1984: 117), the effect of torture as assigning utterly uneven positions to the 
tortured and his torturer is the major constitutive of the category of detention. What the 
Court traces in the facts presented by the parties is such a relation which connotes that 
death was a result of disproportional force used by state officials in order to find a violation 
of right to life from both substantive and procedural aspects. The significance of torture 
will be better understood as I evaluate other cases in which the cause of death is always 
torture for the applicant, yet changes for the state depending on the particularities of the 
case -such as suicide, natural sickness, accidental fall...etc. 
 
A) Suicide  
 
AA and others v Turkey is an example of the struggle between the applicant and state 
in terms of the attribution of torture and suicide respectively as the cause of death. CA was 
arrested in Diyarbakir in August 1994, for alleged links with the PKK.  Two days after his 
arrest, he was found hanged in his cell. The forensic report states that CA had hanged 
himself when he was alive and it cannot be inferred that he was killed before being hanged. 
In March 1995, the District Attorney of Diyarbakır heard the testimony of three officers 
responsible for questioning CA. Denying the allegations, the officers refuse that marks 
found on the body of the deceased were caused by them. By a ruling of April 1996, the 
Criminal Court of Diyarbakır   acquitted the three officers due to lack of sufficient 
evidence, finding that CA had committed suicide due to his abnormal psychological state. 
The Court of Cassation upheld the ruling of First Instance Court in November 1998, and 
the applicant, having exhausted the domestic remedies, takes the case to the ECtHR where 
the applicant alleged that CA died from torture inflicted in detention.  The state, presenting 
the autopsy report before the Court, argues that CA committed suicide. The difference in 
the allegations of the parties also point to a difference in the identification of the deceased; 
for the applicant, CA, a vulnerable detainee, was subjected to torture and died as a result of 
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disproportional use of force by the officials, while for the government, CA, a free 
individual, died as a consequence of his own choice to take his life.  
 The first question that the Court must respond to is whether CA was killed by the 
state officials or by his own hand. As neither the autopsy report nor the witness statements 
indicate that CA died as a result of torture, the Court dismisses the first question on the 
grounds that the allegation is not proved to the necessary standard of proof adopted by the 
Court which is proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’ The second question the Court has to 
tackle under the right to life article is whether the state could have foreseen CA’s suicidal 
tendencies and taken preventive measures to protect his right to life. The change of the 
state’s  status from perpetrator to protector, thus of the degree of responsibility attributed to 
the state for CA’s death alters the scope of the case, which in turn affects the identities of 
the participants (Felstiner et al, 1980).  The Court must then go on to assess whether the 
authorities knew or ought to have known of CA’s suicidal tendencies by taking into 
consideration the ‘difficulties of policing modern societies’, the ‘unpredictability of human 
conduct,’ the ‘availability of resources’ and priorities.43 Moreover, the positive obligation 
of the state to protect right to life involves not every risk to life, but only the situations in 
which the state remained inactive in the face of real and immediate risks. In CA's case and 
other similar cases44, the questions of whether there indeed was a real and immediate risk 
and whether prison officials should have known about it are measured through the mental 
health reports on CA before his death. The applicant, however, did not provide the Court 
with any report indicating that CA had psychological problems which would have required 
                                                            
43The exact phrase the Court uses in its case law to decide whether the state has failed its positive obligation 
or not is, ‘’Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human 
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the 
positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention 
requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to 
arise in the context of where the risk to a person derives from self-harm, such as a suicide in custody, it must 
be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual and, if so, that they failed to take measures within the 
scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’’ 
 
44 The phrase appers in all cases in which the Court considers whether the government has failed to fulfil its 
positive obligation under the article, which is to protect right to life : Uçar v Turkey App. No. 52392/99 
paragraph [84] , Akdoğdu v Turkey App. No. 46747/99 paragraph [45], Tanrıbilir v Turkey App. No. 
21422/93 paragraph [70], A.K and V.K v Turkey App. No. 38418/97 paragraph [42], Kılavuz v Turkey App. 
No.8327/03 paragraph [68], A.A and Others v Turkey App. No. 30015/96 paragraph [45].  
  
27
the authorities to take special care because of potential self-destructive behaviour. Basing 
its decision on the absence of such a report, the Court concluded that it would put a 
disproportionate burden on the authorities to hold them responsible for failing to protect the 
right to life of CA and therefore found only a procedural violation. For the Court, as there 
was no medical report, he was found to be mentally normal and state officials could not be 
expected to anticipate suicidal tendencies in a normal man due to the ‘unpredictability of 
human conduct.’ 45  
  There are a total of seven cases in which the state denies responsibility on the basis 
of suicide.  I chose AA and others v Turkey is because in CA’s case, the Court dismisses 
the applicant’s allegation and does not find a substantive violation of right to life despite 
the existence of an autopsy report showing that CA was subjected to torture.46 Constructing 
CA as a free agent, who chose to commit suicide by his own will while in detention, the 
Court does not find a substantive violation of the article, in contradiction with its case law 
which puts the liability of death incidents occurring in detention on governments. The fact 
that evidence of torture was seen on CA’s body is a matter that will be dealt with under 
Article 3, prohibition of torture, not the right to life by the Court; unless it can be proved 
that it is specifically torture which is the cause of death.  
 
B) Accidental Fall  
 
The question of what constitutes a breach of Article 2 should be considered in relation 
to the Court’s tendency to measure the suffering that an individual had to experience while 
dying in its evaluation of whether there is a violation of the right to life or not. In that sense 
not only cases in which death is seen as a result of suicide but also the ones in which death 
is a result of a fall are excluded from constituting a substantive violation of Article 2 by the 
                                                            
45 In Kilavuz v Turkey case, similarly, the applicant again alleges that Kilavuz did not commit suicide as 
alleged by the authorities, but was killed during detention. The Court, in this case, is led to give a substantive 
violation of article 2 to the state asserting that the state failed to protect the right to life of Mr Klavuz; since a 
medical report drawn during his detention stating that he was suffering from psychological problems exits. 
The court concludes that because his state of mind was not normal and this fact was known by the authorities, 
some extra measures should have taken by the state to prevent his suicide. 
46 See also Akdogdu v Turkey(46747/99)  which is also very similar to AA and others v Turkey in that the 
Court decides that death came as a result of suicide despite the autopsy report which suggests that the 
deceased was subjected to torture. 
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Court. In H.Y. and Hu.Y. v Turkey47, the applicants are the parents of Mahmut Y. Mahmut 
Y. was arrested at the age of 15 in 1997 on the basis of information from a PKK member. 
Upon his arrest he went through the usual medical checks and was found healthy.  Three 
days later he died. The state and the witnesses (inmates sharing the same cell with Mahmut 
Y.), claim that Mahmut fell off one of the two wooden benches placed in the cell, hitting 
his head on the ground. The forensic report confirms the state’s claims, finding the cause of 
death to be 'acute dural hematoma' which could be caused by acute trauma such as a fall. 
During the domestic proceedings, the prosecutor demanded a second forensic examination 
of the body to determine whether there were traces of torture on the body. In its final report, 
the forensic committee concludes that ''death could have been caused both by a direct 
traumatic shock as a result of an accidental fall or a fall caused by a third party, without it 
being possible to favour one of the assumptions.''48 However, Mahmut's uncle who was 
heard during the domestic proceedings claims that he saw some bruises and scars that were 
bloody on the shoulders of Mahmut's corpse. The evidence of torture noticed by the 
relatives was explained by forensic experts to be due to 'post-mortem changes'. The 
domestic proceedings resulted in the acquittal of the accused officer due to the absence of 
forensic evidence that could support the allegations of Mahmut's relatives. Despite the 
Court's case law which requires the government to provide a satisfactory and convincing 
explanation as to the allegations of death and injury occurring in detention, in this case, 
ascertaining that death came in consequence of a fall, the Court rejected the applicant’s 
allegation, since it did not meet the required burden of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) and 
found no substantive violation of Article 2.  
In Erikan Bulut v Turkey, the applicant, Erikan Bulut, who was arrested in Istanbul by 
officers from the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Pendik Security Directorate on suspicion of 
aiding and abetting the PKK, alleges he was made to drink drugged tea as a result of which 
he lost consciousness and found himself in the hospital, having fallen out of a fifth-floor 
window of the office of the Security Directorate Building. The state denied the applicant’s 
allegations and attested that when Erikan Bulut was taken to the office to sign his release 
report, he ran and jumped out of the window. As the office in which the incident took place 
                                                            
47 H.Y. and Hu.Y v Turkey (40262/98), paragraph 33. 
48 Ibid, paragraph 53 
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was solely used by police officers, the state contends there was no real and immediate risk 
on the basis of which the police officers should have taken extra care or placed window 
guards to prevent Erikan’s suicide. The absence of  risk, alleged with a view to support the 
state’s denial of any  positive obligation to protect the right to life, was accepted by the 
Court and Turkey was found to have breached only the procedural aspect of the Article. 
Erikan Bulut’s case was heard by the Court after the police officers involved were 
acquitted in domestic proceedings. According to the Court:   
Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court's task to substitute 
its own assessment of facts for that of the domestic Courts and as a general rule it is 
for those Courts to assess the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by 
the findings of domestic authorities, in normal circumstances it requires cogent 
elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those authorities.49 
Fact-finding exercises were actively carried out by the Commission in the early 1990s 
for the cases lodged from the State of Emergency region due to the explicit absence of such 
proceedings and structural inaccessibility of  legal mechanisms under the State of 
Emergency Rule.50 The Court, however, in cases for which domestic proceedings exist, but 
are alleged to be ‘unjust’ by the applicants, will not reexamine the finding of facts, unless 
there are cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of the domestic authorities. 
In Erikan Bulut case the Court decides to evaluate the case based on the facts established by 
the domestic Courts, which means that the evidence such as forensic reports and witness 
statements as set forth in the case file during the domestic proceedings. However, in Erikan 
                                                            
49 Erikan Bulut v Turkey, (51480/99), paragraph 28. 
 
50 The first legislative decree no. 285 (10 July 1987), established a regional governorship of the State of 
Emergency in ten of the eleven provinces of south-east Turkey. Under Article 4 (b) and (d) of the decree, all 
private and public security forces and the Gendarmerie Public Peace Command are at the disposal of the 
regional governor. The second decree no. 430 (16 December 1990), reinforced the powers of the regional 
governor, for example to order transfers out of the region of public officials and employees, including judges 
and prosecutors, and provided in Article 8: “No criminal, financial or legal responsibility may be claimed 
against the state of emergency regional governor or a provincial governor within a state of emergency region 
in respect of their decisions or acts connected with the exercise of the powers entrusted to them by this 
Decree, and no application shall be made to any judicial authority to this end. This is without prejudice to the 
rights of individuals to claim indemnity from the State for damage suffered by them without justification.” 
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Bulut's case, this resulted in an inconsistency between the statements of Erikan Bulut’s 
current lawyer and Erikan Bulut’s own statement before the domestic court. Because the 
Court accepted the testimony of Erikan Bulut given during the domestic proceedings where 
he denied having been subjected to torture, it was concluded by the Court that there is an 
inconsistency between the applicant and his representative.51 Accepting that there are 
divergent versions as to the circumstances which led to the Erikan Bulut’s fall from the 
window, the Court decided that there is an insufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that 
the applicant was thrown out the window by the police officers. Thus the Court takes the 
position that it will recognize the vulnerability of the applicant when it has been established 
that he has been tortured, but does not recognize such vulnerability when the validity of his 
own statement is disputed on the basis that he was tortured. In all such cases52, the Court 
finds only a violation of Article 2 based on the state’s failure to conduct an effective 
investigation after death incidents. The officials are discharged of their substantive 
obligations under Article 2 through the case law which considers human as unpredictable 
and the state as responsible only for preventing acts it could be expected to predict.  
The Court recalls that after spending one night in custody, the applicant was seen by a 
doctor on the day of the incident before being brought to the Pendik Security 
Directorate Building to be released. There is no mention of a psychological distress in 
the medical report and it is undisputed that the applicant was aware of the fact that he 
was about to be released. As a result, the Court concludes that there is no evidence 
about the applicant’s actions or behavior that ought to have put the authorities on 
notice that he posed a danger to his life.53 
 
Thus, other kinds of violence, for instance the possibility of Erikan’s being thrown 
out the window by police officers or in the case that CA indeed committed suicide but not 
tortured to death, the possibility that he committed suicide due to his psychological state as 
a person subjected to torture - unless conceived within the meaning of torture do not 
amount to a substantive violation of the right to life article within the Court’s case law. The 
restriction of the type of violence to torture in detention, however results in the exclusion of 
other violent acts that cannot be named as torture from constituting a violation of the 
                                                            
51 Erikan v Turkey (51480/99), paragraph 16 
52 Kilavuz v Turkey (8327/03). 
53 Erikan Bulut v Turkey (51480/99), paragraph 36. 
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Convention.  Hence in detention cases, death amounts to a substantive violation of the 
article in terms of state’s liability for the death, only when death is the consequence of 
torture or ill-treatment. In the majority of detention cases a substantive violation of Article 
2 is followed by the Court’s finding a violation of the Article 3. This is even the case in 
disappearance cases where the body of the deceased is never found. However, this time the 
Court finds a violation of the Article 3, together with the Article 2, for the relatives of the 
deceased in the absence of the ones who are the direct victims of right to life. 
 
C) Disappearances 
There are fourteen cases54 in which the names of the alleged detained people do not 
show up in custody records. All of these cases are lodged to the Court from the provinces 
under State of Emergency Rule. What distinguishes these cases from the others is that 
while in the cases outlined above, the state acknowledges that the persons in question were 
detained or at least had a confrontation with the state forces, and accounts for the cause of 
death; in these cases detention is unacknowledged. In disappearance cases where the 
detainees are kept is not known; but what is known is that they are seen ''being taken away 
to an unidentified place of detention.''55 The pattern in majority of these kinds of cases is 
that the applicants complain about the unacknowledged detention or disappearance of their 
relatives who were taken into custody following an operation in the village. The state 
defends itself by the non-existence of such a security operation as alleged by the applicant 
and the absence of the names of those who have been alleged to have disappeared in the 
custody records. The main dispute between the applicant and the state is over the space in 
which death occurred. For the former, what is at stake is to prove to the Court that the 
person in question, allegedly dead, was indeed taken and detained by the state forces so that 
the burden of proof can be put upon the state. When confronted with such an allegation 
whose possible veracity would potentially result in Court's finding a substantive violation 
                                                            
54 For disappearance cases, see; Cicek v Turkey (25704/94), Ipek v Turkey (25760/94), Orhan v Turkey 
(25656/94), Osmanoglu v Turkey (48804/99), Kurt v Turkey (24276/94), Diril v Turkey  (68188/01), Tas v 
Turkey (24396/94), Timurtas v Turkey  (23531/94), Akdeniz v Turkey (25165/94), Akdeniz and others v 
Turkey (23954/94), Ertak v Turkey (20764/92), Suheyla Aydin v Turkey (25660/94), Tanis v Turkey 
(65899/01). 
55 Orhan v Turkey (25656/94). 
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of right to life, the state wholly denies the alleged presence of the disappeared people in any 
of its detention centers. In disappearance cases the applicant relies on witnesses, while the 
state rests its claim upon its records on which the name of the disappeared person never 
appears. The Court, in these cases, does not bound itself with the custody records kept by 
state officials; on the contrary, acknowledges the unreliability of these records in its case 
law and notes that the absence of the names of the allegedly disappeared people cannot be 
seen to be conclusive proof that they were not detained. 
In these cases what is referred as death is actually the disappearing of the person. For 
the Court, the more time goes by without any news of the detained person, the greater the 
likelihood that the person has died. 
In the general context of the situation in south-east Turkey in 1994, it can by no 
means be excluded that an unacknowledged detention of such persons would be life-
threatening [...] It is to be recalled that the Court has held in earlier judgments that 
defects undermining the effectiveness of criminal law protection in the south-east 
during the period relevant also to this case, permitted or fostered a lack of 
accountability of members of the security forces for their actions.56 
 As the body of the disappeared is never found, therefore not subjected to post-
mortem analysis for the identification of the facts regarding the case, the absence of body 
imputes more importance on the witness statements. Since most of the incidents of 
disappearances occurred in a village setting, often following an operation in or around the 
village. In a large number of cases villagers' testimony that the deceased was last seen in 
the hands of the state forces suffices for the Court to give both substantive and procedural 
violations of the Article. In cases where the government denies detention, but concedes the 
operation, the government's witnesses are mainly village guards and soldiers who 
participated in the particular military operation, in consequence of which the persons in 
question are allegedly detained. The commanders of the operations mostly do not show up 
despite the request of the Commission during its fact-finding exercise and remain unheard 
by the Commission delegates. In the majority of the disappearance cases, the Court finds a 
violation of right to life from both substantive and procedural aspects. 
                                                            
56 The phrase appears in all disappearance cases. 
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 Touching on sensitive political issues and confronted with allegations of grave 
human rights violations, the court has been careful to maintain the appearance of 
impartiality: 
It is to be further observed that the applicant and his witnesses were simple, 
unsophisticated persons who were testifying in regard to matters of great personal 
concern and pain, with attendant risks that their interpretation of events might be 
coloured by emotion.57 
 
The emotion attributed to the testimony of the applicant does not only come from the 
pain of having lost a relative, but also the presumed political motivation of the applicants as 
inhabitants of a place which has become the scene of a perpetual conflict between the state 
forces and the PKK:  
The Court cannot overlook either that the area in which the applicant and his 
witnesses lived at the time was part of a wider region which was the scene of fierce 
fighting between the PKK and the security forces. It cannot be excluded that many 
inhabitants of that region, including in the applicant's own locality, might have 
sympathised with the PKK cause and seized on opportunities to discredit the 
government forces by making unfounded allegations against them58. 
 
The case law also shows that the Court is also aware of the vulnerability of the 
political situation in the south-east in terms of human rights violations: 
Between 1992 and 1994 a large number of disappearances and unexplained killings 
occurred in south-eastern Turkey in the context of counter-insurgency measures 
against the PKK.59  
 
The facts presented by applicants are similar in most of the disappearance cases.  Yet, 
Kurt v Turkey60 differs from other unacknowledged detention cases, not necessarily in 
terms of the facts presented by the applicant, but the way the Court reasoned and rendered 
its judgment. The incident referred to in the Kurt case took place in Bismil, in the village of 
                                                            
57 Ipek v Turkey (25760/94), paragraph 115. 
 
58 Ibid, paragraph 117. 
 
59 Cicek, Orhan, Timurtas 
 
60 Kurt v Turkey (24276/94). 
  
34
Ağıllı in November, 1993. The applicant alleged that following intelligence reports that the 
'terrorists' would visit the village, the security forces took up positions in the village. They 
stayed for three days at the end of which ten houses were burnt down and the villagers were 
told to evacuate the village. On the second day of the operation, the soldiers gathered the 
villagers in the school yard. One of the suspected persons they were looking for was Uzeyir 
Kurt who was not at the schoolyard at the time of the gathering. Upon receiving the 
information that Uzeyir Kurt was in his aunt's house, the soldiers went to the house and 
arrested him. He spent two nights with soldiers in the house of another villager, Hasan 
Kılıç. On the following morning, Uzeyir Kurt's mother received a message from a child that 
Uzeyir Kurt wanted some cigarettes. She took the cigarettes to Hasan Kilic's house. Outside 
the house, she saw him surrounded by ten soldiers and six village guards, with bruises and 
swellings on his face. Being told to leave by the soldiers, she left and this was the last time 
she saw Uzeyir Kurt and there is no evidence that he was seen elsewhere after this time.  
The government asserts in response to the allegations that Ağıllı is a small village 
from which about fifteen men and women had joined the PKK, one of whom was Türkan, 
the granddaughter of the applicant. An operation did take place in Agilli, yet Uzeyir Kurt 
was not taken into custody by the security forces. There was no reason for him being taken 
as he did not have any previous history of detention or problems with the authorities. For 
the government, Uzeyir Kurt either joined the PKK or was kidnapped by the PKK. It was 
confirmed by the other villagers that the shelter, found outside the village by the security 
forces after the operation, was used by Uzeyir Kurt in his contacts with the PKK. 
The Commission held a hearing in Ankara and listened to the testimony of the 
witnesses and the applicant. The Commission rejected the government's contention that 
Üzeyir Kurt was either kidnapped by the PKK or left the village to join the organization, 
since the government’s allegation is without any basis and cannot rebut the applicant’s 
eyewitness account of her son’s detention. In the end, the facts of the case established by 
the Commission and presented to the Court were that the applicant saw Uzeyir Kurt 
surrounded by soldiers and village guards outside Hasan Kılıç’s house and this was the last 
time he was seen by any member of his family or anyone from the village. The 
Commission however decided that Uzeyir Kurt’s case does not fall within the scope of 
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Article 2 due to the absence of any evidence as to the fate of Uzeyir Kurt subsequent to his 
detention in the village. The Commission found that facts of the case support a claim under 
Article 561  (Right to Liberty) rather than Article 2. In her submission to the Court, the 
applicant asserted that torture, unexplained deaths in custody and disappearances are 
common practices in the southeast Turkey, and the routine nature of these practices should 
lead the Court to find that Uzeyir Kurt was also a victim of such practices. The Court as a 
mechanism dealing with individual complaints refused to find that Uzeyir Kurt died in 
custody simply because there is a well established practice of disappearances on the part of 
the Government. The Court stated:  
 
Almost four and a half years have passed without information as to his subsequent 
whereabouts or fate. In such circumstances the applicant’s fears that her son may have 
died in unacknowledged custody at the hands of his captors cannot be said to be 
without foundation. She has contended that there are compelling grounds for drawing 
the conclusion that he has in fact been killed.... However, like the Commission, the 
Court must carefully scrutinize whether there does in fact exist concrete evidence 
which would lead it to conclude that her son was, beyond reasonable doubt, killed by 
the authorities either while in detention in the village or at some subsequent stage.62 
 
The Court did find  a violation of the right to liberty in Uzeyir Kurt's case based on 
witnesses’ description of  Uzeyir Kurt standing in the middle of soldiers and village guards, 
and therefore in  detention. Yet what is not known and cannot be known by the Court is 
whether or not he died while surrounded by state forces. Therefore the Court analyzed the 
case through Article 5 (right to liberty) rather than the right to life on the basis of the 
assumption that Uzeyir Kurt is still alive in the absence of contrary evidence in support of 
his death.  
Orhan v Turkey is one of the cases that took place in Cağlayan village, Kulp. In this 
case the applicant alleged that the first time soldiers arrived in the village, the imam 
announced that everyone was asked to assemble in front of the mosque by the commander 
who in turn informed the villagers that their houses would be burnt so they could leave and 
                                                            
61 Article 5 of the ECHR is “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” 
 
62 Kurt v Turkey (24276/94).  
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pick up their possessions. The soldiers set fire to the houses in the village. Given the 
permission by the Kulp District Gendarme Commander to leave after harvesting their 
crops, the villagers waited to harvest their crops before leaving the village. Eighteen days 
later, the soldiers came back, this time in larger numbers. The soldiers told the applicant’s 
two brothers and his son that the Commander wanted to see them and that they could come 
back after they saw the commander. They were then taken by the soldiers to the 
Gümüşsuyu Village where a number of villagers also saw that the Orhans were with the 
soldiers there, asking for help. 
The government acknowledged that there had been numerous counter-insurgency 
military operations in the province of Diyarbakır at that time, but denied having held an 
operation and taken the Orhans into detention. Finally, the Court, having already disputed 
the accuracy of custody records in the area for the time, accepts that the Orhans were 
initially detained by the soldiers in Lice Boarding School which had a separate military 
complex at that time.63 The Court views the Orhan case as a right to life case, 
distinguishing it from the Kurt case, because; 
 
Üzeyir Kurt was last seen surrounded by soldiers in his own village, whereas 
the Orhans were last seen being taken away to an unidentified place of 
detention by authorities for whom the State is responsible.64  
 
Another reason for the Court’s distinguishing the Orhan case from the Kurt 
case is related to the time that had passed since the Orhans were last seen: 
In this respect the period of time which has elapsed since the person was placed 
in detention, although not decisive in itself, is a relevant factor to be taken into 
account. It must be accepted that the more time goes by without any news of 
the detained person, the greater the likelihood that he or she has died. The 
passage of time may therefore to some extent affect the weight to be attached to 
                                                            
63 The name of Lice Boarding School appears in a large number of disapparance cases.  As a result of the 
constant appearance of the name of the school in relation to torture and disappearance incident, the Court 
asked the authorities in  several cases (Orhan v Turkey, Cicek v Turkey) the name of the officer in charge of 
the military complex in Lice Boarding School, who appears frequently in the testimonies given in 
unacknowledged detention cases. However, the name of the officer has never been submitted to the Court and 
the officer was not listened as a witness by the Commission delegates. The Court asks the government plan of 
the place and the officers on duty there. However only a plan of the school in which the military complex was 
excluded was handed in to the delegates. (Cicek v Turkey). 
64 Orhan v Turkey (25656/94) paragraph 330 and Akdeniz v Turkey 
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other elements of circumstantial evidence before it can be concluded that the 
person concerned is to be presumed dead. In this respect the Court considers 
that this situation gives rise to issues which go beyond a mere irregular 
detention in violation of Article 5. Such an interpretation is in keeping with the 
effective protection of the right to life as afforded by Article 2, which ranks as 
one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention (...).”65 
 
The Court also sees Timurtas v Turkey66, another unacknowledged detention case 
from Cizre, as a right to life case, distinguishing it from the Kurt case again by the length of 
time that passed since the disappearance: 
Six and a half years have now elapsed since Abdulvahap Timurtaş was 
apprehended and detained – a period markedly longer than the four and a half years 
between the taking into detention of the applicant's son and the Court's judgment in 
the Kurt case. Furthermore, whereas Üzeyir Kurt was last seen surrounded by 
soldiers in his village, it has been established in the present case that Abdulvahap 
Timurtaş was taken to a place of detention – first at Silopi, then at Şırnak – by 
authorities for whom the State is responsible.67 
 
How the Court distinguishes these cases is important because it is on this basis that it 
decides on the compensation that the government must pay. Ronan Shamir (1996: 233) 
uses the term ‘conceptualism’ to understand law’s mode of operation: 
Conceptualism is a mode of cognition based on the belief that the most accurate and 
reliable way for knowing reality (hence "truth") depends on the ability to single out 
the clearest and most distinct elements that constitute a given phenomenon. 
Conceptualism is a praxis of extracting and isolating elements from the indeterminate 
and chaotic flow of events and bounding them as fixed categories. Each concept must 
relate to only one aspect of things, and the pure concept is simple and well 
demarcated, in contrast to vague and flexible images and sensory data. 
Conceptualism, in short, works through isolation, division, separation, and fixity, 
conceiving reality as a series of moments and not as an ongoing process. 
It is possible to consider the Court’s distinguishing the Kurt case from other 
disappearance cases and analyzing it under Article 5 rather than Article 2 through the law’s 
                                                            
65 Timurtas v Turkey, Cicek v Turkey, Orhan v Turkey…etc. 
 
66 Timurtas v Turkey (23531/94). 
 
67 Timurtas v Turkey, paragraph 85. 
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“conceptualist” mode of operation. In the Kurt case, despite its acceptance  that Üzeyir Kurt 
was last seen surrounded by soldiers and referring to the circumstances as detention, the 
Court freezes that moment and decides to evaluate the case through Article 5 as opposed to 
other similar cases where the disappered individuals were last seen being taken by officials. 
Due to the conceptualist mode of operation, the subsequent fate of Uzeyir Kurt becomes 
unknown to the judges who are therefore led to view the case as an issue of liberty rather 
than life. The Court simplifies chaotic flow of events by associating certain moments or 
scenes with specific articles, whereby similar stories are seen  to fall under different 
articles. 
In disappearance cases the Court finds a violation of Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture) 
together with a violation of Article 2 despite the absence of the body of the disappeared. 
Yet, the breach of Article 3 is found not with respect to the disappeared person but to the 
applicant as the body of the former is never found. For example, in Cicek v Turkey, the 
applicant stated:  
...the disappearance of her two sons at the hands of the security forces constitutes 
inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in respect of 
herself. She accordingly requests the Court to find that the suffering, which she has 
endured, engages the responsibility of the respondent State under Article 3 of the 
Convention.  
 
The government, in response, stated that “there is no causal link between the alleged 
violation of her sons’ rights under the Convention and her distress and anguish.’’68 The 
Court decided that there is a violation of Article 3 for the applicant with respect to the 
uncertain situation in which the applicant inquired for the whereabouts of his son or 
requested to be given his body: 
 
The Court observes that the applicant has had no news of her sons for almost six 
years. She has been living with the fear that her sons are dead and has made attempts 
before the public prosecutor and requested the authorities to be at least given their 
bodies. The uncertainty, doubt and apprehension suffered by the applicant over a 
prolonged and continuing period of time has undoubtedly caused her severe mental 
distress and anguish...Having regard to the circumstances described above as well as 
                                                            
68 Cicek v Turkey (25704/94) paragraph 171. 
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to the fact that the complainant is the mother of victims of grave human rights 
violations and herself the victim of the authorities’ complacency in the face of her 
anguish and distress, the Court finds that the respondent State is in breach of Article 3 
in respect of the applicant.69 
  
In the case law, the type of incidents covered by Article 3 is differentiated on the basis 
of the degree of suffering. Not every act that inflicts pain is called torture. Article 3 also 
covers acts which do not amount to torture, but are referred as “inhuman and degrading 
treatment.” For instance in Cicek v Turkey and similar disappearance cases, when the Court 
finds a violation of Article 3 with respect to the relatives of the disappeared person, the 
suffering caused by the disappearance and the indifferent attitude of the state officials are 
referred as not torture but inhuman and degrading treatment.  
Alan Hunt argues that the elements of ideology cannot be reduced to a mere reflection 
of economic or social relations, yet the ideology itself has an internal discourse, an internal 
dimension that the semiotics seeks to grasp through the concept of ‘’sign’’ (Hunt, 1993). I 
suggest that in the type of detention cases analyzed in this Chapter, Article 3 is that sign 
through which the Court evaluates whether there is a violation of the right to life. However, 
in cases where the Court equates disappearance with death, as the disappearance of 
individuals makes it impossible for their bodies to be analyzed post-mortem, the finding of 
violation of Article 2 is followed by a violation of Article 3 with respect to their relatives. I 
suggest that the reason for this is related to the case law which portrays detainees as 
vulnerable and therefore in need of state’s protection. Through finding a violation of Article 
3, thus stating that a detainee is subjected to torture, the identity of the detainee is 
constructed as vulnerable in compliance with the case law on detention. Therefore the 
detainee’s death is considered to amount to a violation of right to life, since the 
vulnerability of the detainee makes it impossible for the state to justify its use of force by 
arguing that it was ‘absolutely necessary.’ It is through torture that the Court constructs the 
identity of the detainee as a suffering being therefore vulnerable or vice versa, because 
torture, as an utterly disproportional act, inscribing an uneven relation between the detainee 
and the officials, helps the Court to evaluate the circumstances in which death took place. 
In other words, the circumstances in which one can be reduced to a body without voice, as 
                                                            
69 Ibid, paragraph 173-174. 
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Scarry argues, or to someone whose voice becomes inaudible in her demands for inquiry 
from state officials while searching for a body, either dead or alive constitute the conditions 
for the Court to evaluate the identities of the deceased as a villager or a militant, a 
vulnerable detainee or a rebel. The reason for this is that the circumstances through which 
torture can be used as a technique by the officials requires an already uneven relationship 
between the two sides. The disproportionality that the practice of torture entails and the 
negation of the state’s claim of its use of force as absolutely necessary through the 
construction of the detainee as vulnerable are significant in the Court’s evaluation of 
whether an act constitutes a violation or not.70 Once an individual can be constructed as 
vulnerable within the circumstances of his/her death, the Court can even associate open 
spaces such as villages or streets with detention centres and treat them as places where the 
state has full jurisdiction and knowledge.    
 
Villagers as Detainees 
 
The impact of torture in the Court’s decision is perhaps most salient in Akkum v 
Turkey where the Court draws a parallel between the detainees and the villagers who were 
allegedly killed by state forces. In Akkum v Turkey, according to the applicant, Mehmet 
Akkum took the village animals to graze on the plains around the Kursunlu village together 
with Mehmet Akan to undertake his duty as a shepherd according to the village rota in 
Dicle district of Diyarbakir in November 1992.71 When they were on the mountainside, 
they came across the soldiers and the soldiers surrounded the two Mehmets. They were last 
seen alive in the mountains by two other villagers, Hacire and Hediye. The two women 
were told by the soldiers to go back to the village. On the way back home they saw Dervis 
and told him to go back as there were soldiers everywhere and the two Mehmets had been 
taken by them. At that time the soldiers appeared and hit Derviş on his shoulder with their 
rifle butts. Then firing began from all around the plain and Derviş was shot. Since the 
                                                            
70 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that in a large number of cases submitted 
to the ECtHR in relation to article 2, no substantive violation is found by the Court despite the state’s 
claiming responsibility for the death. The reason is that the cases fall under the 2nd paragraph of article 2 
under which acts of killing conducted by proportional use of force are justified.  
71 Akkum v Turkey (21894/93). 
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bullets caused the dust to rise, the women could not approach Derviş's body, but ran back to 
village to take shelter. The next day, the villagers went to the plain to find the bodies, but 
found only animal corpses. They went to Dicle to make inquiries about the incident and 
inform the authorities of the disappearance of the Mehmets and the death of Derviş. Not 
receiving any word about the fate of the men, they came back to village, and later in the day 
they were informed that the bodies of Derviş and one of the Mehmets were found in the 
plains. The body of the other Mehmet was later found in Elazığ, mutilated and his ears cut 
off.  
The allegations of the applicant are denied by the government. According to the 
government, a large PKK base had been previously been dismantled in the area and an 
operation had been carried out to prevent the PKK from re-establishing itself. Yet, the 
inhabitants of the nearby villages were already informed beforehand so that they would not 
enter the operation area. In the course of the clash the soldiers returned fire at the 
individuals they believed to be terrorists, who were hiding behind a herd of animals, owned 
by villagers from Kurşunlu village and were firing at the soldiers. No soldier was injured 
during the operation. When the firing stopped, the soldiers started a search and found a 
body which was deemed by the soldiers to be that of a person assisting and harbouring 
terrorists. During the search, the soldiers also found a number of spent cartridges. 
Members of the gendarme were subsequently tried in the Diyarbakir Military Court, 
and acquitted due to lack of evidence and eyewitnesses. Testimony of Hacire and Hediye 
passed into the records of the domestic proceedings to the effect that the two women were 
not aware that an operation was taking place and did not see anything. The forensic report 
was also prepared without details by an ordinary doctor, as there were no forensic experts 
in the Dicle district of Diyarbakir at that time. The reports used throughout the domestic 
proceedings, however, only demonstrated the bullet entry and exit point in the body, but not 
the type of arms used and the distance of shooting. According to the applicants, all the men 
were shot at close range, which indicates that they were not involved in an armed clash, but 
were ordinary villagers who went up to the mountains to graze their animals and were 
killed by the soldiers for no reason.  
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The Commission held a fact-finding hearing in Ankara and heard the testimony of the 
witnesses. It also requested on more than one occasion that the government submit the 
operation report and other documents concerning the domestic proceedings, but they were 
never received and no reason was given by the government for the failure. As neither the 
applicant nor the Court had access to these documents without the Government’s 
cooperation, the Court was led to decide in the absence of important, possibly decisive, 
documents. The Court inferred from the government’s failure to comply that the applicants' 
allegations were well founded and found both substantive and procedural breaches of 
Article 2 (right to life).  
 
The Court considers it legitimate to draw a parallel between the situation of detainees, 
for whose well-being the State is held responsible, and the situation of persons found 
injured or dead in an area within the exclusive control of the authorities of the State. 
Such a parallel is based on the salient fact that in both situations the events in issue lie 
wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities.72 
 
The Court accepted the facts as presented by the applicant and decided that the 
deceased were villagers who were on the plain to graze their animals rather than people 
aiding and abetting PKK members as alleged by the state. Concluding that the deceased 
were unarmed and subjected to arbitrary treatment by the soldiers on duty, the Court 
equated the villagers with detainees. Akkum v Turkey is the only case in which the Court 
found a substantive violation of the Article 2 by establishing a connection between 
detention centres and the plains upon which the villagers’ death occurred. The decision of 
the Court in the Akkum case should again be considered in relation to the Court’s finding a 
violation of the Article 3 with respect to the father of Mehmet Akkum whose body was 
mutilated by the soldiers. The applicant states that the mutilation of the ears of his son by 
the soldiers is contrary to the Article 3 in relation to him, since as a Muslim he had to bury 
an incomplete and mutilated body. The Court states: 
...the Court has no doubts that the anguish caused to Mr Akkum as a result of the mutilation 
of the body of his son amounts to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. It 
                                                            
72 Ibid., paragraph 209. 
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follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in relation to the first 
applicant, Zülfi Akkum.73 
 
The reason for finding a violation of the Article 3 for the first applicant is explained 
by the Court: 
 
In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be “inhuman” or 
“degrading”, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that 
inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of 
legitimate treatment or punishment. The question whether the purpose of the 
treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a further factor to be taken into 
account, but the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a violation 
of Article 3.74 
 
The Akkum case is not the only one in which Turkish soldiers were accused of 
mutilating bodies of the deceased.75 However, it is only in the Akkum case that the Court 
finds a violation of Article 3 in relation to the applicant, since in the other cases the 
deceased whose bodies were mutilated were considered by the Court to be armed at the 
time of death and therefore a substantive violation of Article 2 was not found on the 
grounds that the state’s use of force was absolutely necessary. In contrast to these cases, in 
the Akkum case the construction of the villagers as vulnerable by the Court resulted in the 
Court’s finding violations of both Articles 2 and 3.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I tried to show how the Article on torture in the Convention is 
significant in the Court’s evaluation of whether or not there is a violation of the right to life, 
by giving examples from different cases. In the majority of the detention cases the Court 
finds a violation of the right to life only when a violation of the Article 3 can also be found. 
The significance of Article 3 in the Court’s decisions is related to the tendency of the Court 
                                                            
73 Ibid paragraph 259. 
74 Ibid paragraph 257. 
75 The other two cases are Kanlibas v Turkey (32444/96), judgment of 08/03/2006 and Akpinar and Altun v 
Turkey (56760/00), judgment of 27/05/2007. 
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to find a violation of the right to life only when a detainee can be constructed as a suffering 
being due to his vulnerable condition. Therefore in cases where the state alleges that death 
is not a result of torture but suicide or accidental, the Court does not find a substantive 
violation of the right to life. The main reason is that because in the incidents of suicide and 
accident, which are considered as matters of individual choice or personal negligence, the 
detainees cannot be constructed as vulnerable beings. Therefore the Court’s case law which 
projects all detainees as vulnerable is not applied in these cases and a substantive violation 
of the Article 2 is not found.  
In disappearance cases, where the Court usually finds violations of Articles 2 and 3, 
although the body of the deceased is never found and therefore never examined to 
determine whether he was subjected to torture, the Court finds a violation of the Article 3 
for the suffering of the applicants rather than the deceased. Even where killing occurred 
outside a detention centre, when the Court is convinced that the deceased was unarmed at 
the time of death, the Court finds a violation of both the Article 2 and 3 in relation to the 
suffering of the applicant by establishing a connection between detainees and villagers. 
However, the Court’s finding violations of Article 2 and 3 together has certain implications 
for the application of the human rights norms. First, this results in the exclusion of other 
possible killing or death incidents from judicial protection and restricts the type of violence 
of the state functionaries to torture. Second, by trying to measure the suffering caused by a 
particular action to decide whether there is a violation of the Article 2, the Court restricts 
what constitutes a human rights violation to acts which are assumed to have caused 
suffering.       
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CHAPTER IV 
RENAULT TOROS AS A DETENTION PLACE? 
Introduction 
In recent years, particularly with the acceleration of the obligations of the states under 
international law, states have sought judicial oversight where they engage in torture to 
protect them from unfavorable international or domestic attention. By ‘judicial oversight,’ I 
refer to the failure to take notice of acts in contravention with human rights principles 
within the legal mechanisms. Perhaps the most common of such practices is the ‘torture 
flights’ used particularly in the US ‘war against terror’ whereby the victims are carried to 
territories outside of the US in which torture is frequently used allegedly as a technique of 
obtaining information. The cases analyzed in this Chapter provide some insight into the 
attitude of international human rights law and its constraints about numerous incidents of 
killings occurring in these ‘judicial oversights.’ 
In these cases the main claims are for abduction and killing by state officials. The 
cases usually involve journalists, human rights activists and lawyers. There were sixteen 
abduction cases brought before the ECtHR during the 1990s. These cases are different from 
those analyzed in the previous Chapter, in that the government is accused of abduction 
instead of irregular or unacknowledged detention. The legal framing of the cases as 
‘abduction’ is significant, because this fundamentally challenges the human rights system 
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which envisions the state as a legal and rational body responsible for the provision of 
human rights norms in its jurisdiction. This system acknowledges the prospect of killing by 
state officials, but the cause of death is explained away as technical failure in the planning 
and conduct of state agents (like the neglect of the officials to record the names of the 
detainees properly) or bad legislation (such as State of Emergency Rule), implying that 
improvement will be observed once better laws and expertise are introduced. The 
accusation of ‘abduction’ addressed to the government, however, puts into question the 
intrinsic relation between nation state and violence, and designates the state as a body 
having a specific intention to eliminate certain individuals for their political participation, 
ethnicity, religion...etc. The Court’s attitude in these cases is crucial to understanding which 
types of violence and the traumas arising therefrom can be captured and ‘resolved’ within 
or is excluded from the human rights discourse which has become the only accepted 
language of resistance (Rajagopal, 2003).  
In these cases the applicant must prove the link between the government and the act 
of killing, as abduction, according to the testimony of the witnesses, is carried out by 
people in civil attire rather in uniform. Therefore, while in the previous Chapter the main 
concern of the Court was the identity of the deceased, here the focus is that of the 
perpetrators -whether they are in one way or another linked to the government or whether 
their actions could have been predicted or known by officials. The Court, in a significant 
number of abduction cases, finds only a procedural violation on the grounds that the 
government failed to conduct an effective investigation. Although in some cases 
substantive violation is found, it is done in such a way that the state is located as the body 
which could have taken protective measures to prevent the killing, rather than the body 
which kills. The Court’s selectivity in finding a substantive violation results in the framing 
of the incidents of death/killing as if stemming from lack of expertise of the government in 
conducting an effective investigation. Expertise emerges as the salient concept which is 
claimed to have the capability of overcoming obstacles to social, political and legal 
development. 
In this chapter, I will analyze three types of abduction cases in which the Court’s 
decisions vary depending on the degree of official involvement in the abduction and 
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subsequent killing. While, in the first case Kaya and others v Turkey76, the Court finds only 
a procedural violation of the right to life, stating that the authorities can be held responsible 
neither for the killing nor failing to know the risks or protecting the right to life, in the 
second case Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, the Court finds a substantive violation of Article 2 on 
the grounds that the government failed to protect the right to life despite knowing about the 
risks to the life of the deceased. In the third case, Avşar v Turkey, which is the only 
abduction case of its kind, the Court draws a parallel between detention and abduction and 
finds the government ‘guilty’ of abduction and killing. The differences in the Court’s 
approach to these cases, I suggest, is based on the way the Court conceptualizes the spatial 
setting through which the car used for the abduction traversed. The elements of the spatial 
setting, for the Court, are also vital in the construction of the identities of the perpetrators 
and the degree of official involvement in the act. 
 
Toros Car as a Judicial Oversight? 
In November 1996, when Hakki Kaya was walking with his two friends in Diyarbakir 
city centre, a white Toros car with the registration number 06 EKN 22 approached them. 
Three men dressed in civilian clothes and carrying walkie-talkies introduced themselves as 
police officers to Hakki Kaya and his friends and carried out an identity check. At some 
point while looking at the identities, the men with walkie-talkies forced Hakki Kaya into 
the Toros, persuading him to get in by saying that he had to go to the police station to make 
a statement. He entered the car and was never seen again. The applicant, Hakki Kaya’s 
wife, informed various bodies of her husband's disappearance. In March 1997 the Human 
Rights Investigation Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly stated that Hakkı 
Kaya was not in detention and the car with the registration number 06 EKN 22 was a Fiat 
Şahin, and not a white Toros estate car as alleged, and that it belonged to someone who 
resided in Ankara. 
It is possible to expand and narrow the scope of disputes through the legal phrasing of 
the facts (Mather&Yngvesson, 1980/81). I believe abduction cases are good examples of 
                                                            
76 Kaya and others v Turkey (36206/97), judgment of 22/02/2006 
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the expansion of the disputes. It is through this kind of a legal framing, phrasing or re-
phrasing of disputes outside the tacitly accepted legal categories that disputes can be 
expanded. Expansion of a dispute involves the organization of reality by stretching and 
changing accepted frameworks and linking subjects or issues that are typically separated 
(Ibid), as was done in the abduction cases by juxtaposing intentional killing, the state and 
civil men working as murderers in the name of the state. Although in abduction cases, in 
Hakki Kaya’s case as well, the Court mainly found that the government had failed to 
conduct an effective investigation, the fact that these cases are found admissible by the 
Court is meaningful, as the ECtHR is instituted as a mechanism to evaluate and judge 
incidents to which individuals claiming to be the victims of violations by state officials77 
can apply, not the ones whose victim status is caused by private individuals. Applications 
directed against not states but individuals or a group of individuals are supposed to be 
declared inadmissible. Therefore, the mere admissibility of these cases has also certain 
implications, even though at the level of decision making in majority of these cases a 
substantive violation of the right to life is not found by the Court. 
Hakki Kaya’s case was eventually brought to the ECtHR by his wife and two children 
as they received no news regarding his whereabouts from the domestic authorities. Before 
the Court, they alleged that Hakki Kaya had been detained and killed by the state security 
forces, relying on the testimony of the witnesses to the incident, who were accompanying 
Hakki Kaya in Diyarbakir city centre and the interview made with Abdulkadir Aygan78, in 
                                                            
77 Article 25 of the ECHR, 1st paragraph. 
 
78 Abdulkadir Aygan, a former PKK member, is known to have worked  in JITEM. In a series of interviews 
he mentions Hakki Kaya’s name as one of the victims of the organization.  One of these interviews was made 
by Nese Duzel on 28 January 2009, Taraf: "You said ‘’People were reporting, investigations were being made 
and JITEM was questioning.’’ Were there many canaries among people? Many of them were coming. 
Unfortunatelly a lot. There were the ones harmed by the PKK, the ones against the PKK. There were also the 
ones who were reporting out of jealousy to eliminate their competitiors at work. There are people who died as 
a result of these kinds of accusations. For instance... the reason for Hakki Kaya’s death is a confessor called 
Muhsin Gul. He exagerrated by saying that the daughter of him was in the mountain and reported the man. 
There are cases like that. The confessor Muhsin Gul perhaps wanted to take advantage of him. When the man 
did not respond positively, he eliminated the man through JITEM.’’ (Halk ihbar ediyordu, istihbarat 
yapılıyordu ve JİTEM sorguluyordu" dediniz başta bana. Halk arasında çok mu muhbir vardı? Çok mu hbir 
gelirdi. Maalesef çok. PKK'dan zarar görenler, PKK karşıtı olanlar vardı. Kıskançlıktan  ihbarda bulunanlar, 
hasmını, iş hayatındaki rakibini tasfiye etmek için ona buna PKK'lı diyenler vardı. Böyle suçlamalarla da 
ölenler oldu. Mesela... Hakkı Kaya'nın ölümüne Muhsin Gül isimli itirafçı neden oldu. Bunun kızı dağda falan 
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which Aygan stated that Hakki Kaya whose body was buried at the Diyarbakir-Silvan 
motorway was one of the persons killed by JITEM.79 The Government denied the 
allegations and the existence of any possible link between the perpetrators and the officials. 
Eventually the Court found the applicant’s allegation unsubstantiated due to lack of 
evidence, stating that the interview given by Abdulkadir Aygan to the Ülkede Özgür 
Gündem newspaper cannot be attached any decisive importance as it is uncorroborated and 
on the present state of the file, at best circumstantial80.  It is also stated that Hakkı Kaya had 
no previous criminal record and the applicants did not submit any convincing argument 
showing why the domestic authorities might have been involved in the alleged abduction of 
Hakkı Kaya. The Court concluded that the applicant's allegation that the state is responsible 
for Hakki Kaya's disappearance remains a matter of speculation and therefore found only a 
procedural violation of Article 2. While in cases of detention the Court decides through 
assessing the degree of vulnerability of the deceased, in abduction cases the Court seeks a 
fine balance; the deceased should not be an armed person, in which case the incident can be 
framed as ‘self-defence’ nor totally ‘innocent’ on the eyes of the authorities, but should 
have a certain degree of political involvement denounced by the authorities so that the link 
between the killing and government officials can be established. 
Nuray Şen v Turkey case is another important case to examine in relation to the   
circumstances under which the Court will find a substantive violation of Article 2 where a 
state fails its positive obligation to protect the right to life. Mehmet Şen was an active 
member of DEP. According to the applicant who is Mehmet Şen’s wife, in November 1994 
he was abducted by plain-clothes policemen from the cafe of which he was the owner and 
taken to a car waiting outside. He was never seen again. The applicant alleged that Mehmet 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
deyip işi şişirdi ve adamı ihbar etti. Böyle olaylar var. İtirafçı Muhsin Gül belki adamdan menfaat temin 
etmek istemişti. Adam vermeyince, o da JİTEM vasıtasıyla adamı ortadan kaldırmıştı.) 
 
79 JITEM (Jandarma Istihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele) is a gendarmerie intelligence organization claimed to be 
founded by the state for the struggle agaist the PKK in 1987. The commission established in the Turkish 
Grand Assembly for the investigation of the killings in the southeastern Turkey in April 1995 also referred to 
JITEM in its reports. The existence of the organization has not been officially confirmed. 
 
80 Circumstantial evidence refers to the evidence which is based on making an inference to support the 
assertion of truth as opposed to direct evidence which refers to the type of evidence such as witness 
testimonies. 
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Şen was abducted, tortured and killed by the security forces. The government denied the 
existence of any links between state agents and the death of Mehmet Şen, asserting that his 
name is not in any of the custody records and an investigation is still pending. Mehmet 
Şen's body was later found on the Kahramanmaraş-Gaziantep highway construction site. As 
discussed in the previous Chapter, because torture may only be committed by state officials 
to be a violation of international law, whether Mehmet Sen was subjected to torture is also 
a matter of dispute between the parties, as the prospect of his being subjected to torture can 
attest the link between the killers and government officials.  
The applicant saw the body in Gaziantep State Hospital when she entered the morgue 
to examine her husband's corpse. According to the applicant’s description of the corpse the 
right eye of Mehmet Sen was gauged out, the right side of his head was crushed to pieces; 
his right arm was broken, his fingers were broken; there were marks of blows to the body, 
and a bullet wound to the head and one to the neck. There were no traces of blood which 
implied that the shots had been fired after death. Whereas according to the autopsy report, 
there was a bullet wound to the left side of the chest, a bullet wound above the right 
eyebrow fired at almost point blank range and exiting the body from the back of the head, 
and a bullet wound to the left cheek, which had travelled through the body and lodged in 
the rib cage. There were no other wounds, blows to the body or head, and that death had 
been caused by the bullet to the head. 81 The main difference between these two 
descriptions of the corpse is that in the applicant’s version the cause of death is attributed to 
torture, while according to the autopsy report Mehmet Şen was shot to death, but not 
tortured. For the applicant the fact that there was no blood despite the bullet traces on the 
body showed that the shots had been fired not prior to death, as alleged by the autopsy 
report, but after, which supported her allegation that death was a result of torture and not of 
shooting. As the practice of torture is significant in detention cases for the Court to find a 
violation of Article 2, the different descriptions of the corpse became another point of 
contention between the parties.  By framing the cause of death as torture rather than 
shooting in abduction cases, the applicant aims to convince the Court to associate abduction 
with detention and the killers with state officials. 
                                                            
81 Ibid, paragraph 17. 
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Nuray Şen's allegation that Mehmet Şen died as a result of torture by state officials 
was dismissed for insufficient evidence. None of the witnesses who were in the cafe at the 
time of the abduction of Mehmet Şen appeared in the hearings, despite being called by the 
Commission. The Court eventually decided that it was not proved 'beyond reasonable 
doubt' that state responsibility was engaged in Mehmet Şen's death, but also signaled  its 
awareness regarding the high number of death incidents occurring in the south-east: 
The Court draws attention to its previous findings in similar Turkish cases to the 
effect that in 1993 and 1994, as a result of the conflict in south-east Turkey, there 
were rumours that contra-guerrilla elements were involved in targeting persons 
suspected of supporting the PKK. It is undisputed that there were a significant 
number of killings which became known as the “unknown perpetrator killing” 
phenomenon, and which included prominent Kurdish figures. In this respect, the 
Court considers that the circumstances in which Mehmet Şen met his death, his 
membership of the DEP Party (allegedly subjected to intimidation, threats and 
criminal attack), and his political ambitions, might have militated in favour of the 
applicant’s allegations.82 
The Court, despite recognizing that the state might be responsible for Mehmet Sen's 
death, found only a procedural violation of the right to life, since no relation between 
government officials and the perpetrators was established.  
The Court has also considered the extent of the State’s obligation to implement 
protective measures in certain individual cases when the circumstances may require 
them. However, the Court notes that Mehmet Şen did not report his fears about 
being followed by possible “hit-men” prior to his abduction, and did not seek 
protection from the competent authorities.83  
Unlike many of the cases taking place in detention centres, where the burden to prove 
the inaccuracy of the applicant's allegations shifts to the state which in those cases is 
considered to have the 'exclusive knowledge' about the circumstances of a death incident, in 
this case, and many other similar abduction cases, the state is responsible only for 
conducting a proper investigation, since the state officials are considered not to 'know' 
about Mehmet Şen's fears and possible risks to his life as they remained unreported. For the 
Court, in order to find a substantive violation of Article 2 on the basis of the government 
                                                            
82 Nuray Şen v. Turkey (no. 2) (25354/94), judgment of 30/03/04, paragraph 171. 
 
83 Ibid, paragraph, 180. 
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failure to protect the right to life, the possible risks to life should have been reported to the 
authorities so that they could act upon the that information. The paradox, however, is that 
the applicant’s allegation of state killing and the responsibility of protection attributed by 
the Court are simultaneously attributed on the state. In Mehmet Sen’s case, the Court 
distinguishes between the allegations that Mehmet Sen is abducted, tortured and killed by 
the state authorities and that the state failed to protect the life of Mehmet Sen despite its 
awareness that as a member of DEP in south-east context, his life was at risk. Confronted 
with two contradictory allegations, the Court decided that the state cannot be held 
responsible for failing to protect the right the life of Mehmet Sen, because it did not know 
of his fears, and dismissed the first allegation due to insufficient evidence. In so doing, the 
ECtHR, transforms the subject matter of the dispute into something other than what the 
applicant views to be the main reason for taking the case to the Court. By doing so, the 
Court suppresses the trauma that it is set up to resolve; and even, not understanding the 
trauma that it is supposed to be acting on (Felman, 1999). 
Santos argues that modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking consisting of 
visible and invisible distinctions; the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible 
distinctions (Santos 2007). The social reality is divided into two realms along this visible 
and invisible distinction and ''this side of the line'' in which visible distinctions operate 
appear as reality, while the other side of the line, the terrain of invisible distinctions 
vanishes and become non-existent (Ibid). For Santos, it is non-existent in the sense that it 
does not exist in any relevant or comprehensible way of being. He characterizes Western 
modernity ‘’as a socio-political paradigm founded on the tension between social regulation 
and social emancipation (Ibid: 2).’’ However, underneath this distinction there exists 
another distinction, the invisible one, violence/appropriation, on which the distinction of 
regulation/emancipation is founded. The Court by continuously finding a procedural 
violation rather than a substantive one, places the state on ''this side of the line'', the side in 
which the social reality appears to exist along the distinction of 'regulation/emancipation'. 
The acts of the state belonging to ''the other side of the line'', which unfold in the 
testimonies of the witnesses and in the Court's own evaluation of facts are expressed within 
the terminology of the ‘legal’ when it comes to decision-making: The non-legal state 
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practices are treated along the distinction of legal/illegal placed in this side of the line 
governed by the distinction of regulation/emancipation; but never transcend to 'the other 
side of the line' where there is violence/appropriation. 
Knowledge and the Right to Life 
There are a limited number of cases in which the Court is convinced of the existence 
of official involvement in the abduction and killing on the grounds that the particular 
circumstances point to the possession of knowledge by the government officials regarding 
the incident. Mahmut Kaya v Turkey is one of these cases in which the Court considers the 
roads that the car used for abducting Hasan Kaya travelled on, as under the control of the 
state due to the frequency of checkpoints located along the way. Therefore, for the Court, 
the government should have ‘known’ about the abduction of Hasan Kaya and taken action 
to prevent his murder. 
Hasan Kaya was a doctor in Şırnak between 1990 and 1992, treating demonstrators 
injured in clashes with the security forces during the Newroz celebrations. After being put 
under considerable pressure, he was transferred from Şırnak to Elazığ. Called by his friend 
Metin Can, a lawyer who was also under pressure for his efforts to improve the conditions 
in Elazig prison, regarding a wounded member of PKK, Hasan Kaya meets Metin Can and 
the two set out for a village outside Elazig to treat the wounded guerilla. They never return. 
The other day, their relatives informed the Security Directorate about their disappearance 
and went to Ankara where they appealed to the Ministery of Interior about their 
disappearance. Almost one week later, their bodies were found near Dinar Bridge, outside 
of Tunceli.  
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Before the ECtHR, the applicant relied on Susurluk Report84, Soner Yalçın's book The 
Confessions of Major Cem Ersever where it is disclosed that Mahmut Yıldırım85 who was 
working as a state employee for thirty years was the planner and perpetrator of the Can and 
Kaya murders. The Commission held two hearings, one in Ankara and the other in 
Strasbourg in which the delegates listened to the testimonies of the relatives of Metin Can 
and Hasan Kaya, Elazig and Tunceli public prosecutors, Soner Yalcin, police and 
gendarmerie officers. Finally the delegates stated that they were unable to determine who 
killed Dr Hasan Kaya as there was insufficient evidence to establish that the state agents or 
persons acting on their behalf had carried out the murder. However bearing in mind that Dr 
Hasan Kaya was suspected by the authorities of being a PKK sympathiser, as was his friend 
Metin Can, the delegates asserted that ''there was a strong suspicion, supported by some 
evidence that persons identified as PKK sympathisers were at risk of targeting from certain 
elements in the security forces or those acting on their behalf, or with their connivance and 
acquiescence.''86 The applicant agreed with the Commission and submitted to the Court that 
in the particular circumstances of the case, Hasan Kaya was suspected of being a PKK 
sympathiser and disappeared with his friend Metin Can, who was also under heavy 
suspicion by the authorities and names of both of the men were in the Susurluk report as 
victims of a contra-guerrilla killing. Further, the way in which they were both transported 
from Elaziğ to Tunceli, through official checkpoints located on the way points to the links 
between the gendarmerie and the perpetrators, showing that Hasan Kaya did not enjoy the 
guarantees of protection required by law and that the authorities were responsible for 
failing to protect his right to life. The state rejected that Susurluk report could have an 
                                                            
84 The applicant provided the Commission with a copy of the so-called “Susurluk report”, produced at the 
request of the Prime Minister by Mr Kutlu Savaş, Vice-President of the Board of Inspectors within the Prime 
Minister's Office. After receiving the report in January 1998, the Prime Minister made it available to the 
public, although eleven pages and certain annexes were withheld. The introduction states that the report was 
not based on a judicial investigation and did not constitute a formal investigative report. It was intended for 
information purposes and purported to do no more than describe certain events which had occurred mainly in 
south-east Turkey and which tended to confirm the existence of unlawful dealings between political figures, 
government institutions and clandestine groups. 
 
85 Mahmut Yildirim’s name has been  raised several times by the media particularly in narratives of the‘deep 
state.’ He is also known as Ahmet Demir and with the code name ''Yesil''. 
86 Mahmut Kaya v Turkey (22535/93), Judgment of 28/03/2000, paragraph 74. 
  
55
evidential or probative value, since the report was prepared with the sole purpose of 
providing information and making some suggestions to the Office of Prime Minister, as 
emphasized in the preface of the report by its authors. The government states: 
State forces has been ''dealing with a high level of terrorist violence since 1984 which 
reached its peak between 1993 and 1994, causing the death of more than 30,000 
Turkish citizens. The situation in the south-east was exploited by many armed 
terrorist groups including the PKK and Hizbullah, who were in a struggle for power 
in that region in 1993-94. While the security forces did their utmost to establish law 
and order, they faced immense obstacles and, as in other parts of the world, terrorist 
attacks and killings could not be prevented. Indeed, in the climate of widespread 
intimidation and violence, no one in society could have felt safe at that time. All state 
officials such as doctors could be said to have been at risk, for example, not only 
Hasan Kaya.''87 
The Court, as seen in the cases above, to decide whether the state can be charged with 
a positive obligation to protect the right to life of Hasan Kaya, discusses if there was a real 
and immediate risk that the state should be aware of. According to the Court, ''Hasan Kaya, 
as a doctor suspected of aiding and abetting the PKK, was at that time at a particular risk of 
falling victim to an unlawful attack.''88 Also, the way in which both Kaya and Can were 
transported from Elazığ to Tunceli through official checkpoints as well as evidence about 
contra-guerrilla groups show that Hasan Kaya did not enjoy the guarantees of protection 
required by law and that the authorities were responsible for failing to protect his life. 
Having been informed of the disappearances the next day that the two men left Elazığ by 
the relatives, the state is considered by the Court to have known the whereabouts of them, 
since there is approximately one week in between the abduction and the killing of the two 
men and the journey included the passing of several official checkpoints. The Court, for 
these reasons found a substantive violation of Article 2 concluding that the risk to Hasan 
Kaya’s life could in these circumstances be regarded as real and immediate and the 
authorities must have been aware of that risk.  
This attitude of the Court to treat a limited number of cases as state-linked while 
leaving the majority of them aside raises the question of where the state begins and ends. 
How is it possible to evaluate the range of what the state can know or its degree of 
                                                            
87 Ibid, paragraph 83. 
 
88 Ibid, paragraph 89. 
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connivance in the killing of someone or by failing to protect him/her? What is the tool to 
evaluate the ken of the state and its degree of jurisdiction that the ECtHR uses and decides 
on the cases? As seen in the preceding chapter, the Court’s understanding of ‘detention’ is 
primarily based on an understanding of space in which the state is considered to have full 
jurisdiction and the exclusive knowledge of the events. If this is the case, what is the point 
of focusing on the extent of state’s knowledge regarding an unlawful incident in 
circumstances that it is the officials who are accused of the unlawful acts? How are 
‘judicial oversights’ created through the denial of jurisdiction and knowledge by the states 
and maintained through the Court’s way of reasoning and decisions in such cases?  
 
Abduction as Detention 
 
In the cases above, although the Court occasionally found a substantive violation of  
Article 2 for the state’s failing to protect the right to life of the deceased, the judges 
constantly oscillate between linking the government with abductors and denying the 
existence of such a link during the proceedings. Avsar v Turkey is the only case in which 
the Court explicitly accuses the government for the abduction and killing, and equalizes 
abduction with detention. Yet, this time the Court, despite acknowledging the official 
involvement, does so, through distinguishing between personal motives of the abductors 
and the official objectives. 
Mehmet Serif Avşar with his brothers and another relative was running a company 
which sold fertilisers to farmers. According to the applicant, in April 1994, five village 
guards entered fertiliser business premises run by Avsar family in Diyarbakir. They wanted 
to  take Mehmet Şerif Avşar into custody, but he did not submit to them. Then they spoke 
on a walkie-talkie and two village guards left to find a police officer. They came back with 
Mehmet Mehmetoğlu and a seventh person. As it is narrated by the applicant, the seventh 
man acted as if he was in charge and the others referred him as “müdür” (director). The 
seventh man who spoke proper Turkish and wore glasses, took Mehmet Şerif Avşar from 
the shop, placing him in a white Toros car. Members of the family followed the car and saw 
it entering the district central gendarmerie. The family then made complaints to the 
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authorities about the abduction and the village guards involved in the incident. Upon the 
accusation of the family, Mehmet Mehmetoglu and the village guards were detained. All 
denied the existence of a seventh person. Upon the confessions of one of the village guards, 
the  body of Mehmet Serif Avsar was found in Silvan-Diyarbakir highway, killed by two 
shots in the head.  
The trial of the five village guards and Mehmet Mehmetoğlu opened in Diyarbakır 
Criminal Court, during which, in contradiction with their previous statements, the 
defendants mentioned about the involvement of a seventh person, a gendarmerie special 
sergeant, in charge of the abduction and the killing of Mehmet Serif Avsar. In Susurluk 
report, which is one of the evidences that the applicant relies on, it is stated that Gültekin 
Şütçü89 and Mehmet Mehmetoğlu are involved in the killing of Mehmet Şerif Avşar. 
Different from the other abduction cases, in Avsar v Turkey, the link between the abduction 
and a gendarmerie official was established by the national Courts before the case was 
brought in the ECtHR. 
In his last submission to the Court, the applicant alleges that his brother was 
arbitrarily killed while in the custody of security officials and that there was a failure by the 
authorities to protect his life and to carry out an effective investigation into his killing.90 In 
addition, according to the applicant, the State did not take operational steps to safeguard the 
life of Mehmet Serif Avsar, while the authorities were informed immediately of the 
abduction. In response, the government submits to the Court that their responsibility would 
be engaged only if it could be proved that the village guards or a gendarme officer had 
committed the murder on the instructions or with the incitement of the authorities, however 
the perpetrators acted for personal motives. According to the Court; it is possible that the 
incident might have been motivated by an official desire to question the Avşars who were 
known to have relatives in the PKK, yet dismisses this possibility due to lack of evidence. 
                                                            
89 Gultekin Sutcu's name was first raised in the trials of the village guards in 1998. He was for the first time 
taken to the Court in 2007. Because he was a soldier at the time of the incident his hearing was held in 
Diyarbakir military Court and he was released. In March 2008, he was again tried and sentenced to 30 years 
by Diyarbakir Heavy Criminal Court. As far as I could see he is the first person to be taken to the court due to 
accusations for conducting activities within JITEM. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=250751 
 
90 Avşar v. Turkey (25657/94), judgment of 10/07/01, paragraph. 383. 
  
58
Therefore, the allegations of the applicant that the village guards are sent to the shop with 
the purpose of taking Mehmet Şerif Avşar away, for the Court, is not proved. Yet, 
following that the Court also states that ''there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the 
village guards were indeed acting at random in taking Mehmet Şerif Avşar.''91 Making 
seemingly contradicting statements about whether the village guards were acting in official 
capacity or by personal motives, the ECtHR acknowledges the official aspect of the 
incident, yet by creating uncertainty regarding the motivations of the village guards, 
refrains from making a statement as to the extent of official knowledge of or connivance in 
the abduction and killing of Mehmet Serif Avsar.  
What distinguishes Avsar case from the other abduction cases is that, first the Toros 
used in the abduction is an official one, which is brought back to the gendarmerie after the 
perpetrators are finished with it. The Court concludes that the incident takes place in the 
exclusive knowledge of the authorities for the captain of the station is confirmed to have 
talked with the village guards and the other two men by the eye-witnesses. In addition, the 
car with which Mehmet Serif Avsar was abducted was driven into the gendarmerie. In 
those circumstances, the Court infers that the presence of the village guards, Mehmet 
Mehmetoğlu, the seventh person and Mehmet Şerif Avşar were known to the gendarmerie. 
The Court states; 
Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge 
of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong 
presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that 
detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to 
provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.92 
 
Avsar case is the only case, despite its being framed as a case of abduction, the Court 
takes it as a detention case; thereby equalizing abduction with detention and associating 
Toros car with custody. What distinguishes Avsar and Mahmut Kaya cases from the other 
abduction cases is the association that the Court established between the Toros car through 
which the abduction is carried out. While in the Avsar case the car used itself was an 
                                                            
91 Ibid, paragraph 318. 
 
92 Ibid, paragraph 392. 
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official one, in Mahmut Kaya case the Toros car used for the abduction went through eight 
check points where state officials were on duty.  
 
Separation of right to life into Substance and Procedure 
 
For Weber, legal domination constitutes the foundation of the bureaucratic 
administration, thus of the modern state and modern capitalism which obtain their 
legitimacy from the existence of a system of rationally made legal rules (Weber cited in 
Cottarrell, 1983). In an excerpt where he discusses the influence of the form of political 
authority on the formal aspects of the law, he asserts that during Rome and Middle Ages, 
‘’the rationality of patrimonial sovereign as well as of ecclesiastical hierarchies were 
substantive in character’’, which means that their major aim was not rational 
systematization of law and procedure, which in turn would provide juridical precision and 
prediction; but it was to construct a type of law appropriate to the ethical goals of the 
authorities (Weber, 1967: 225). Therefore, they did not separate ethics and law. This 
process resulted in the intermingling of ethical concerns and legal duties to a degree that 
separating them and the terms of that separation depended on the volition of the authority. 
In a similar vein, the right to life article, being a legal command and an expression of a 
fundamental ethical premise –thou shall not kill/murder- is separated into procedural and 
substantive aspects depending of the volition of the judges at the ECtHR. In one of his 
dissenting opinion, Judge Bonello, one of the most critical judges of the Court who 
frequently disagrees with his colleagues, states that ‘’The Court, by an admirable process of 
judicial activism “created” the concept of a “procedural violation” of Article 2 in McCann 
and Others v. the United Kingdom in 1995.’’93 The concept is indeed significant, since the 
procedural obligation of conducting a proper investigation might create the possibility for 
the domestic authorities to arrest the officials found guilty of ‘unjustified’ killings. Yet, can 
we really call it a ‘judicial activism’ considering the high number of cases submitted to the 
Court with allegations of grave human rights violations, in which the government is not 
found in substantive violation through failing to fulfil its procedural violation? In other 
                                                            
93 The separation first appears in McCann v UK and is reinforced in Kelly and others v UK, see Mowbray, 
2004. 
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words, in most of the cases outlined above and others in the ECtHR database, the main 
reason for the Court’s inability to decide on the facts of the case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, 
and therefore not finding a substantive violation of the right to life is the deficiencies of the 
criminal investigation. In many of the cases in which the Court only finds a procedural 
violation, but not a substantive one due to insufficient evidence, the state’s failure to fulfil 
its procedural obligation to collect evidence and make a proper investigation is what 
obscures the facts of the case, thereby ‘rescuing’ the state from an accusation of a 
substantive violation of the right to life article. In other words, the procedural and 
substantive aspects of right to life which are separated under the ECtHR legal system are so 
indissolubly linked to one another that the separation creates a legal lacuna through which 
the state could get away with a lesser degree of condemnation for the right to life 
violations. Therefore, the separation bears the risk of reducing the commitment of the state 
under the Convention to a mere follow-up and of overlooking the ethical principle that the 
article is meant to favour. This is the case particularly for the allegations of serious 
violations. Because the facts are in dispute between the parties in such cases, the Court 
cannot establish the facts of the case with certainty due to lack of evidence and the 
allegations of the applicant are hardly considered as fulfilling the Court’s standard of proof. 
Thus, in the end, the more severe the violation is, the more likely it becomes for the states 
to get away with it (Boyle et al, 1997). The two aspects of the article can support one 
another only in the case that the governments implement proper investigation; otherwise 
they remain antithetical to one another.  
Why is there then such a separation in the ECtHR system whose main function is 
stated to eliminate human rights violations and promote human rights values? Is it possible 
to designate the Court as another institution which serves to legitimize the human rights 
violations? If we are to do so, how are we going to account for many other cases in which 
the Court strongly condemns the governments’ wrongdoings? Or how are we going to 
explain the fact that even if the Court does not find substantive violation in quite a number 
of cases, it finds procedural violation on the part of the state? Ronen Shamir argues that 
there is a paradox in Weber’s argument that ‘’law systematically legitimizes the operations 
of state rulers.’’ He asks ‘‘if courts are autonomous, what ensures that they will support 
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those in power? And if they consistently support the rulers, how do they maintain their own 
legitimacy (Shamir, 1990: 792)?’’ For Shamir, one way of inquiring into this riddle is 
through differentiating between the decisions in which a particular Court sustains and 
upholds the government operations and the ones where it condemns. Not only the cases for 
which the Court holds the state actions, but also the ones where it finds a violation of the 
state are important in the Court’s construction of its autonomy. For Shamir, by occasionally 
overruling or annulling governmental policies in some ''landmark cases'', the juridical 
apparatus asserts its independence from the polity; on the other hand, the court can cast the 
cloak of legitimacy over the state as a whole by vindicating other decisions that uphold 
governmental actions as rightful and reasonable (Ibid: 782). Turning back to the cases, by 
almost always finding a procedural violation of the right to life, the Court constructs itself 
as an autonomous body revealing the human rights violations of the governments which 
have set itself up. However, the Court finds only a procedural violation particularly in cases 
which pose a challenge right to the foundational premises of the state system by 
manifesting its close relation with violence. However, finding a procedural violation 
implicates a ‘hope’ by putting the major problem as the ineffective domestic investigation, 
as the proceedings can be re-opened and reexamined depending on the choice of the 
domestic systems (Lambert-Abdelgawad, 2008). ‘Hope’ in that context refers to a belief in 
the possibility of improvement or increase in the degree of expertise that the government 
has in criminal investigation. In the end, the Court’s constantly finding a procedural 
violation, yet hardly a substantive one results in the framing of the incidents of death/killing 
as if stemming from lack of expertise of the government. This approach, however, neglects 
the political content of the killing/death incidents by obliterating the motives and interests 
of different agents whereby some are rendered less worthy, therefore more disposable and 
killable. Instead, expertise emerges as the salient concept which is claimed to overcome the 
obstacles to social and political development. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I gave examples from different abduction cases to show how the 
Court’s decisions differ from one another depending on the degree of knowledge of the 
state and the spatial setting in which the abduction was carried out. I argued that the 
imagining of the state as bounded within certain spatial settings such as a gendarmerie 
station and the construction of the state’s knowledge of the existing risks to life of people to 
the existence of reports stating that risks result in the Court’s finding only a procedural 
violation of Article 2 in abduction cases. The construction of the state sometimes as an 
omnipresent entity and other times as a limited body with restricted knowledge and 
jurisdiction, points to the uncertain character of the state in the human rights discourse. 
This uncertainty, however, bears the risk of not treating a great majority of the cases as 
substantive violations of the right to life article in a region where State of Emergency was 
the rule. The Court’s finding only a procedural violation in these cases results in the 
framing of allegations of grave human rights violations as consequences of the officials’ 
lack of expertise in criminal investigation. This, however, conceals the more profound 
problem which is how some political ideals and interests render some people less worthy 
and therefore more killable. In abduction cases, by finding only a procedural violation and 
trying to evaluate the state’s degree of knowledge regarding the incidents, the Court fails to 
understand the trauma for which the case is taken to Strasbourg.    
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
“Frequently and regularly the Court acknowledges that members of vulnerable 
minorities are deprived of life or subjected to appalling treatment in violation of 
Article 3; but not once has the Court found that this happens to be linked to their 
ethnicity. Kurds, coloureds, Muslims, Roma and others are again and again killed, 
tortured or maimed, but the Court is not persuaded that their race, colour, nationality 
or place of origin has anything to do with it. Misfortunes punctually visit 
disadvantaged minority groups, but only as the result of well-disposed coincidence.” 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bonello) 
 
On an October morning in 2002, when the staff of the ECtHR came to the building to 
start their work, they came across something unusual; the window of the main gate had 
been broken. A rumor soon began to circulate to the effect that the window was stoned 
either by an applicant unhappy with a decision of the Court or by someone whose case was 
among the tens of thousands found inadmissible in the early procedural phases (Morvai, 
1998).  
Recently the ECtHR gained much importance in the lives of many citizens of the 
member countries and has appeared as an alternative to the domestic legal system, perhaps 
the only one, for those who believe their demand of justice will not be dealt with 
adequately at the domestic legal system. The dramatic increase in individual petitions to the 
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Court in recent years resulted in the changing of the procedural system of the Court in 1998 
with the aim of improving efficiency and shortening the time taken for individual 
applications. The Court is also frequently regarded as the ‘’crown jewel of the world's most 
advanced international systems for protecting civil and political liberties’’ in various 
circles, both academic and civil society (Helfer, 2008). However, it is important to note that 
despite being bombarded with individual applications under various articles of the 
Convention by Kurds, the Court has not used the ‘prohibition of discrimination’ Article 
until now. This attitude of the Court is frequently criticized by both legal scholars and 
activists not only in the context of the cases submitted by Kurds but also in relation to 
Roma people and Muslims in Europe. The strategic litigation cases lodged by NGOs and 
bar associations continue with the aim of inviting  the Court to find a violation for 
discrimination, which is considered as a potential means of legal recognition of Kurdish 
identity in the Turkish Constitution. Yet, some ECtHR judges have begun to express their 
dissatisfaction through dissenting opinions against the Court’s passivity in using the 
discrimination article. The cases analyzed in this thesis therefore should be considered in 
light of the growing reputation of the Court in approaching human rights issues and its 
limitations in eliminating human suffering. 
ECtHR decisions are significant in drawing public attention to human rights 
violations in Turkey. Regardless of verdict, allegations of state violence enter the public 
realm to shape the public image of the Turkish state in Europe. ECtHR cases confirmed the 
existing image of the Turkish state as the perpetrator of human rights violations. Activist 
groups have also instigated Court action with the aim of drawing attention to human rights 
violations in Turkey. Opinions in such cases, whether dissenting or concurring are also 
significant gains for such groups. According to Article 45 of the Convention, if a judgment 
does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall 
be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. Such dissenting opinions emphasize that the Court 
is not a single body but rather consists of several judges. For example, the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Bonello quoted above has become encouraging for activist groups seeking 
recognition of their allegations of discrimination against Kurds. 
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By examining several cases (many of which are hundreds of pages long) in detail, I 
have tried to delineate patterns and processes of reasoning through which the Court 
evaluates applicant and government claims, establishes the facts of cases and renders its 
decisions. Taking detention as a spatial category where the government has full power and 
control, I have tried to illustrate that whether or not a particular incident is to be referred to 
as detention is often in dispute. I have suggested that in the majority of the detention cases, 
death constitutes a violation of the right to life only when it is determined that torture is the 
cause of death. This is related to the case law of the Court establishing that the state must 
account for detainees’ injuries, since detainees are in a vulnerable condition and the 
detention centers are places where the state has full jurisdiction and knowledge about the 
events. Torture as a practice is significant for the Court to construct the detainees as 
vulnerable, suffering beings, while assisting the Court to evaluate the degree of the state’s 
jurisdiction and knowledge about the course of events that led to death. The practice of 
torture establishes disproportional and therefore unlawful use of force by state officials 
while the circumstances of torture can be viewed as a means to help the Court to evaluate 
the question of the state’s degree of knowledge and jurisdiction. Even in disappearance 
cases where the body of the deceased is never examined by forensic experts, the Court finds 
a violation of Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture) with respect to the applicant rather than the 
deceased together with Article 2. However, the Court’s restriction of the cause of death to 
torture in order to find a substantive violation of the right to life indicates that many other 
possible incidents of state killings are not captured and remedied within human rights 
discourse.  
In cases where the applicants allege that the state forces are responsible for abduction 
and killing, rather than detention, the Court usually finds only a procedural violation for the 
state’s failing to conduct and effective investigation on the grounds that there is insufficient 
evidence to establish a connection between the abductors and government officials. 
Restricting the state’s knowledge and jurisdiction to certain spatial settings such as 
detention centers renders the Court incapable of coming to terms with the concerns of the 
applicants in cases of abduction which should arguably be actionable before the Court. The 
Court’s constantly finding only a procedural violation and occasionally a substantive 
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violation of Article 2 results in not only the silencing of the underlying relation between 
nation state and violence, but also in framing of the right to life violations as if emanating 
from lack of expertise in criminal investigation.  
I am aware that this study, aimed at understanding the internal dynamics of legal 
discourse, is restricted with legal analysis, and I had to leave aside the implications of Court 
decisions upon the public. To better understand the context in which those cases were 
submitted to the Court and the cultural and political impact of the Court decisions requires 
further analysis of the process through which relatives of the victims learn about the 
ECtHR procedures and get involved in transnational networks; which incidents or killings 
reach the ECtHR mechanism and which don’t; and how the process of submitting a case to 
the Court shapes the perception regarding the legal, local and national. Only then can we 
shed light on the question of how common knowledge regarding Turkey’s bad reputation 
on human rights is constituted in European and domestic public opinion despite the Court’s 
decisions which rarely find any substantive violation in  cases  against Turkey.  
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